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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Dec. 9, 2020

Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC

Judge
Paul Gardephe
Docket
1:20-cv-00885
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
8
DiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave denied Stewart’s request to lift a protective order blocking Andrés’s deposition.

Who this affects

The ruling affected Derrick Stewart’s effort to depose José Ramon Andrés in the wage-and-hour action; the protective order remained in place.

What happened

Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC is a wage case in which Derrick Stewart alleges that the defendants failed to pay overtime and wages for work performed off the clock, violating federal and New York law. He sought to question José Ramon Andrés about his involvement in the business.

The court had previously barred Andrés’s deposition while the defendants’ dismissal motion was pending. Stewart asked to lift that order, citing testimony that he said showed Andrés helped interview, hire, train, and direct workers. The defendants argued that Stewart had not opposed the original protective-order request and had not shown a sufficient reason to change it.

Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave denied the motion. She found that the defendants had relied on the protective order and that the cited testimony did not show an extraordinary need for Andrés’s deposition or that he had unique knowledge about Stewart’s claims. The ruling did not decide whether Andrés was Stewart’s employer under the wage laws.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC · No. 1:20-cv-00885
Judge
Paul Gardephe
Date
Dec. 9, 2020

Background

Derrick Stewart brought a proposed collective and class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law against Hudson Hall LLC, Hudson Hall Holdings LLC, Think Food Group, LLC, and José Ramon Andrés. He seeks unpaid overtime wages, unpaid wages for off-the-clock work, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Stewart alleges that the defendants operated restaurants, bars, and kiosks within Mercado Little Spain and that he worked at several of those locations before his employment ended on September 15, 2019.

The court had entered a protective order barring Stewart from deposing Andrés, at least while the defendants’ motion to dismiss was pending. Stewart had not opposed the request for that order. He later moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to lift it. He relied on deposition testimony from Michael Principe, Mercado Little Spain’s Executive Director, and on Stewart’s own testimony, arguing that the evidence showed Andrés had interviewed, hired, trained, and directed personnel, developed menus, and performed quality control.

Legal standard

The court applied the Second Circuit’s strict standard for modifying a protective order. Once parties have reasonably relied on such an order, modification generally requires a showing that the order was improvidently granted or that an extraordinary circumstance or compelling need exists. Courts consider the order’s scope, its language, the level of inquiry before entry, and the nature of the parties’ reliance.

Court’s analysis

The court first noted that Stewart’s earlier decision not to oppose the protective order made his later challenge a change in litigation strategy, which by itself was not enough to undo the order. The court then found that the defendants had reasonably relied on the order. The order clearly prevented Andrés’s deposition while the dismissal motion remained pending, and the defendants had not diverted Andrés’s attention or spent resources preparing him for a deposition. Stewart also did not explain why the deposition had to occur within 20 days.

The court concluded that the cited testimony did not establish an extraordinary circumstance or compelling need. It found Stewart’s testimony indirect, self-serving, and unpersuasive. The court also found that Principe’s testimony did not establish that Andrés handled day-to-day operations, hired or interviewed employees or chefs, trained hourly employees, or set their schedules. At most, the testimony suggested that Andrés had input into menu selections and meal preparation, but Stewart did not show how that conduct related to the claims or defenses or demonstrated unique personal knowledge about operations, payroll practices, or Stewart’s employment.

The court expressly did not decide whether Andrés was Stewart’s employer under the federal or New York wage laws. It decided only that Stewart had not met the standard for modifying the protective order at that time.

Disposition

The court denied Stewart’s motion to lift the protective order and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion on the docket.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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