Jones Bey v. La Casse

Background

Sister E. Jones-Bey, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York, Dana La Casse, a Child Protection Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services, and Vicknell Powell, whom Jones-Bey identified as her landlord. She invoked federal-question jurisdiction and alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights.

Jones-Bey alleged that on September 28, 2020, an unidentified person made a false report to the New York State Office of Children and Family Services Registry. She said La Casse then came to her apartment and tried to enter and question her and her children without permission or a warrant. She also alleged that La Casse held a meeting about her tribe without her knowledge or consent and filed a fraudulent petition in Bronx County Family Court seeking removal of her children from her custody. The opinion states that it was unclear whether the children were actually removed.

Jones-Bey alleged that Powell, whom she called La Casse’s coconspirator, intercepted her mail, took a package belonging to her, and presented fraudulent information to city and state officials to intimidate and harass her and force her and her children to leave their apartment. Documents attached to the complaint showed that Powell was attempting to evict Jones-Bey and collect back rent that she allegedly owed. Jones-Bey sought money damages and penalties.

Screening standard

Because Jones-Bey was allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires dismissal of a qualifying complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court also noted that it must dismiss a case if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the legal authority to hear the dispute.

The court explained that it must read filings from people without lawyers liberally, but such filings must still provide a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief and enough facts to make the claims plausible.

Claims involving the Family Court proceedings

The court treated Jones-Bey’s claims against the City and La Casse as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a constitutional or federal legal right was violated by a person acting under state authority.

For a substantive due-process claim involving removal of a child, the alleged government conduct must be extremely shocking, arbitrary, or egregious. The court held that Jones-Bey’s allegations did not meet that standard. Her allegations that the report was false and the petition was fraudulent lacked details about the petition and what actually occurred. The court also noted that a parent does not have a right to be free from an investigation by the Administration for Children’s Services.

The court separately considered whether the complaint alleged a procedural due-process violation. Such a claim requires facts showing a protected liberty or property interest and a deprivation of that interest without a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court found that Jones-Bey did not provide facts about the proceedings or explain how the defendants deprived her of a protected interest without due process. It therefore concluded that she had not stated a claim for relief on that basis.

The court also explained that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because one employee or agent allegedly acted wrongfully. A plaintiff must allege that a municipal policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation. If Jones-Bey wished to pursue claims against New York City, the court required her to identify facts suggesting that such a policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged violation. The court cautioned that doctrines concerning federal review of state Family Court proceedings might also affect any amended claims, but it deferred that issue because the requested relief was unclear.

Claims involving Powell

The court concluded that Jones-Bey’s claims against Powell appeared to concern landlord-tenant disputes governed by New York law, rather than federal law. Although Jones-Bey might have been attempting to allege interference with her mail, the court stated that a private person cannot bring a civil case to prosecute an alleged federal criminal violation.

The court also considered diversity jurisdiction, which can allow a federal court to hear state-law claims when the opposing parties are citizens of different states and the amount in dispute exceeds $75,000. Jones-Bey alleged that both she and Powell were domiciled in New York. Because they were therefore alleged to be citizens of the same state, the court held that it could not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the claims against Powell. The court stated that nothing in the order prevented Jones-Bey from seeking relief in state court.

Disposition

The court granted Jones-Bey leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint had to provide a short and plain statement of the facts supporting each claim against each defendant, identify relevant people and their titles, describe what each defendant did or failed to do, provide dates and locations, explain the alleged injuries and rights violations, and state the relief sought. The amended complaint would replace the original complaint rather than supplement it.

The Clerk of Court was directed to mail the order to Jones-Bey and note service on the docket. No summons would issue at that time. The court warned that if Jones-Bey did not timely amend and could not show good cause for the failure, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The order did not make a final merits determination of the claims.