Nelkenbaum v. State of New York

Background

Yehuda Nelkenbaum, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying filing fees, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Police Officer Jordy, Police Officer Chavalier, Sergeant Schevering, Sullivan County Assistant District Attorney Leigh Wellington, and unidentified defendants. He alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with New York state-law claims.

Nelkenbaum alleged that on August 23, 2018, police officers came to his apartment in Loch Sheldrake, New York, asked him to open the door and come outside, and then forcibly entered when he refused. He claimed the officers unlawfully searched the apartment, arrested him, used excessive force during the arrest and transfer, and left the apartment unlocked, after which property was stolen.

Nelkenbaum also alleged that, while he was held after his arrest, Wellington discussed the arrest with Schevering and instructed Schevering to release him. He claimed they instead decided to process the arrest and required him to post a $100 bond because they feared he would sue for false arrest. He further alleged that Wellington prosecuted him for criminal failure to obey a court-issued order of protection using false, misleading, or incomplete evidence; lied to the judge; pressured him to accept an adjournment leading to dismissal; and moved to dismiss the charge on July 17, 2019, after the case had been scheduled for jury selection and trial.

Motion and standard

Wellington moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Nelkenbaum did not oppose the motion despite receiving multiple extensions, so the court treated the motion as fully submitted and unopposed. For purposes of the motion, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Nelkenbaum’s favor, while disregarding legal conclusions and allegations that appeared to concern a different case.

Official-capacity claims

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against Wellington in her official capacity. Because the allegations concerned actions she took as a prosecutor, the court treated her as an agent of the State for purposes of this immunity analysis.

Individual-capacity claims and prosecutorial immunity

The court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity barred Nelkenbaum’s claims against Wellington in her individual capacity. This immunity protects prosecutors from civil damages claims for conduct within the prosecutorial role and closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case.

The court concluded that the immunity covered Wellington’s alleged decisions to prosecute Nelkenbaum, continue the prosecution despite allegedly inadequate or false evidence, move to dismiss the criminal charges, make allegedly false statements in court, pressure Nelkenbaum to accept an adjournment leading to dismissal, and maliciously prosecute him. The court also held that allegations of collusion with police officers or improper motivation did not change the result because the immunity depends on the function performed, not the prosecutor’s alleged motive or manner of acting.

Personal involvement

The court separately held that Nelkenbaum did not plausibly allege Wellington’s personal involvement in the officers’ alleged entry into and searches of the apartment, his arrest, his physical treatment after arrest, any denial of medical attention, or the alleged fabrication or withholding of evidence. A claim under § 1983 requires allegations that each government defendant personally participated through that defendant’s own actions.

State-law claims

After dismissing the federal claims against Wellington, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law claims against her.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court denied leave to amend because the defects in the claims against Wellington were substantive and could not be cured by better pleading. Wellington’s motion to dismiss was granted. The court also dismissed any claims Nelkenbaum attempted to bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because that statute does not create a right of action, certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied fee-free status for an appeal, and directed the Clerk to terminate Wellington from the action. The opinion does not resolve the claims against the other defendants.