Speyer v. Decicco Family Markets, Inc.
- Philip Halpern
- 7:20-cv-06478
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Speyer v. Decicco Family Markets, Judge Halpern dismissed Speyer’s CBA-related contract complaint with prejudice.
Joseph Speyer’s claims against DeCicco Family Markets, Inc., Rosa Zuniga, Jim Capriotti, and Christina DeCicco were dismissed with prejudice. The ruling also terminated the action.
What happened
Speyer v. Decicco Family Markets, Inc. involved Joseph Speyer’s claims that the defendants breached a collective bargaining agreement by failing to pay for transfers, hours worked, and training-related lost wages. Speyer also asked the court to require arbitration.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims were governed by federal labor law because they depended on interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. The court also considered that Speyer had not alleged that he completed the agreement’s required arbitration process or that a union had violated his rights.
Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the claims were preempted by federal law and that they also failed to state a claim under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The detailed version
- Speyer v. Decicco Family Markets, Inc. · No. 7:20-cv-06478
- Philip Halpern
- Jan. 11, 2021
Background
Joseph Speyer, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a 41-word complaint in New York state court against DeCicco Family Markets, Inc., Rosa Zuniga, Jim Capriotti, and Christina DeCicco. He alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement and listed claims concerning nonpayment for transfers to other stores, nonpayment for hours worked, and lost wages allegedly caused by misleading information about training. He asked the court to order arbitration and award fees and other costs. The defendants removed the case to federal court.
Motion to dismiss
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Speyer’s claims were completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and that the complaint failed to state a Section 301 claim. They also moved under Rule 12(b)(5), which concerns insufficient service of process, but the court did not decide that alternative ground.
Court’s analysis
The court held that Speyer’s state-law contract claims were preempted by Section 301 because they depended directly on rights created by, or on interpretation of, the collective bargaining agreement. The court noted that the agreement addressed transfers, hours of work, and wages, the subjects of Speyer’s allegations. As a result, the court would not allow the common-law contract claims to proceed and would consider them only under Section 301.
The court also concluded that dismissal was proper even if the claims were treated as Section 301 claims. A pure Section 301 claim against an employer generally requires exhaustion of the grievance process required by the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement stated that arbitration was the sole remedy for a breach and that courts could be used only to compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. The court found no indication that Speyer had first pursued arbitration; instead, his complaint sought to compel arbitration.
The court separately rejected treating the case as a hybrid Section 301 claim. Such a claim requires allegations that both the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and the union breached its duty of fair representation. Speyer’s complaint contained no allegation of wrongdoing by the union and no indication that he had interacted with the union about his grievances.
Disposition
Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Speyer’s complaint. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice because it found that amendment would be futile. It directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion, the other letter motions, and the action. The court also noted, without relying on it as the dispositive ground, that Speyer had not opposed the motion or otherwise participated in the case as described in the opinion.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.