Taveras v. New York City, New York

Background

Alan Taveras applied to the New York City Police Department’s Rifle/Shotgun Section for a permit to possess a rifle or shotgun in his home in the Bronx. The application was denied based on his arrest history, summons history, domestic-violence history, and history of orders of protection. The appeal decision referred to two domestic incidents involving his former girlfriend, one of which led to an arrest and an order of protection. The charges were later dropped, and the order of protection expired in February 2012.

Taveras filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He challenged several New York City Administrative Code and Rules provisions under the Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due-process guarantee. He also challenged several New York Penal Law provisions regulating unlicensed firearm possession under the Second Amendment. Finally, he argued that the City’s rifle-and-shotgun licensing rules were preempted—that is, displaced or barred—by New York State’s firearms licensing law.

Claims and motion

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally viable claim. Taveras voluntarily withdrew his procedural-due-process claims. The court therefore granted the motion as to those claims without further analysis.

The remaining federal claims concerned:

- Second Amendment challenges to 38 RCNY § 3-03(f) and (g), both facially and as applied to Taveras; - Second Amendment challenges to Administrative Code § 10-303(a)(2), (6), (7), (9), and (g), both facially and as applied to Taveras; and - Second Amendment challenges to Penal Law §§ 265.01(1), 265.01-b, 265.02(5)(i), 265.03(2), 265.04(2), and 265.15(6).

Standing rulings

Standing is the requirement that a plaintiff show a personal, concrete injury caused by the challenged conduct that a court decision could remedy. The court held that Taveras lacked standing to challenge Administrative Code § 10-303(a)(6), (7), and (g). His application materials showed that the decision relied on Administrative Code § 10-303(a)(2) and (9) and 38 RCNY § 3-03(f) and (g), not the other provisions. The court also noted that subsection (g) concerns revoking an already-issued license, while Taveras challenged the denial of an initial application.

The court also held that Taveras lacked standing to challenge the specified Penal Law provisions. Those provisions concern possession of items classified as firearms under state law, including possession of multiple firearms. The court explained that standard rifles and shotguns are not classified as firearms under the relevant state-law definition. Taveras did not allege that he intended to possess a covered firearm without a license, or that he intended to possess three, five, ten, or more such firearms. The court therefore found no imminent risk of prosecution under those provisions and dismissed the claims.

Second Amendment merits ruling

For the remaining Second Amendment claims, the court assumed, without deciding, that Taveras’s desire to keep a rifle or shotgun in his home for self-defense implicated a right protected by the Second Amendment. Applying the Second Circuit’s two-step framework, the court used intermediate scrutiny, a level of constitutional review requiring a substantial relationship between the challenged rule and an important government interest.

The court concluded that the challenged City provisions survived intermediate scrutiny both facially and as applied. The provisions allow officials to consider an applicant’s moral character, history of orders of protection, and history of domestic violence when deciding whether good cause exists to deny a permit. The court found that these rules were aimed at public safety and crime prevention, and that they imposed less than a substantial burden because they formed part of a licensing system rather than an outright ban on rifle and shotgun ownership.

As to Taveras specifically, the court held that the officials constitutionally applied the provisions when they considered his history of summonses, arrests, domestic violence, and orders of protection. The court rejected Taveras’s argument that only felons and people with mental illness could lawfully be denied firearm possession.

State-law preemption claim

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Taveras’s state-law preemption claim. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case. The court found that the preemption issue presented a novel or complex question of New York law better suited for a state court.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in full. It dismissed the federal claims with prejudice. It dismissed the state-law preemption claim without prejudice to Taveras’s ability to bring that claim in state court. The court directed the clerk to terminate the pending motions, adjourn the remaining dates, and close the case.