Lawtone-Bowles v. U.S. Bank National Association

Background

Nicole Lawtone-Bowles, representing herself and proceeding without paying the filing fee, filed the action against U.S. Bank National Association, Select Portfolio Servicing, Steven J. Baum, P.C., and Phionah N. Brown. The complaint identified the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, a federal law concerning certain mortgage-loan servicing practices, as the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court had ordered Lawtone-Bowles to explain why she had not timely served U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, and Steven J. Baum, P.C. She did not respond. In a separate order docketed the same day, the court dismissed the claims against those unserved defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The opinion states that Brown was therefore the only remaining defendant.

Brown’s Motion

Brown moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Brown was named because she represented U.S. Bank in a foreclosure proceeding against Lawtone-Bowles in New York State Supreme Court. The court explained that the federal statute creates private claims under sections 2605, 2607, and 2608, and that Lawtone-Bowles specifically invoked section 2605.

Section 2605 concerns mortgage-loan servicing and escrow-account administration. The statute defines a “servicer” as the person responsible for servicing a loan, including receiving scheduled borrower payments and making required payments from those amounts. The court found that the complaint did not allege that Brown performed activity meeting that definition.

The court also read the complaint as intending to assert state-law fraud claims against Brown based on her representation of U.S. Bank. Because the federal claims against the other defendants had been dismissed and Brown was not independently subject to the federal mortgage-servicing law as a servicer, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—meaning authority to hear related state-law claims—over the claims against Brown. A footnote adds that the court found no independent basis for original federal jurisdiction under either federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court granted Brown’s motion to dismiss. The claims for relief against Brown were dismissed without prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion and close the case. The opinion does not state a separate disposition qualifier for the claims against the unserved defendants beyond their dismissal under Rule 41(b) in the separate order.