Massaro v. The Department of Education of the City of New York

Background

Yvonne Massaro was an art teacher employed by the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, also known as and doing business as The Department of Education of the City of New York, from 1989 through July 2016. In 2011, she sued the defendant alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). That lawsuit was dismissed in May 2013. Massaro later filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge in August 2016 and brought this action alleging age discrimination and retaliation based on both the 2011 lawsuit and the EEOC charge.

The district court had dismissed her claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the age-discrimination claim but sent the retaliation claim back for further proceedings, holding that the alleged harms, considered together, were enough to survive a motion to dismiss. The defendant then moved for summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

Summary-Judgment Standard and Retaliation Framework

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but that party must identify evidence in the record rather than rely on speculation.

Under the burden-shifting framework used for ADEA retaliation claims, the plaintiff first must provide evidence that she engaged in protected activity, the employer knew about it, the employer took materially adverse action, and the protected activity caused that action. The employer then may provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, after which the plaintiff must provide evidence that the stated reason was a pretext, meaning a cover for retaliation.

Time-Barred Conduct

The ADEA generally requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Because Massaro filed her charge on August 3, 2016, the court treated conduct before October 8, 2015, as time-barred unless it qualified as part of a continuing violation. The court explained that a continuing violation requires repeated conduct resulting from a discriminatory policy or mechanism, not merely multiple similar incidents.

The court held that the following alleged conduct was time-barred: the 2012 unsatisfactory rating and related disciplinary actions, the 2013 investigation concerning alleged corporal punishment, and the back-to-back class scheduling during the 2014–2015 school year. The court also held that Massaro had not identified evidence showing that the allegedly continuous classroom, scheduling, student-assignment, equipment, advanced-course, and lab-fee issues resulted from a discriminatory policy or mechanism. Summary judgment was therefore granted for the defendant to the extent the retaliation claim relied on conduct before October 8, 2015.

Conduct After October 8, 2015

Massaro identified evidence concerning classroom conditions, student assignments, open-enrollment scheduling, large class sizes, equipment, advanced-course requests, lab fees, removal of student work, a formal observation, access to a workplace-injury video, and her substitute-teaching-license application. The defendant offered conflicting evidence about several of these matters, including whether Massaro had adequate supplies, whether her classes were treated differently from those of colleagues, whether student work was removed throughout the school, and whether she submitted all documents required for the substitute-license application.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find that some of this conduct occurred and that, considered together, it could discourage a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. The court therefore did not grant summary judgment on the ground that these actions were only minor annoyances.

Retaliation Based on the 2011 Lawsuit

The court nevertheless granted summary judgment for the defendant on Massaro’s claim that the conduct occurring between October 8, 2015, and her retirement in July 2016 was retaliation for her 2011 lawsuit. Massaro offered no direct evidence of retaliatory intent and no evidence that comparable employees received more favorable treatment. The court also held that the several-year gap between the 2011 lawsuit and the later conduct was too long to establish causation through timing alone.

Retaliation Based on the 2016 EEOC Charge

Massaro also claimed that the defendant retaliated against her by denying or failing to issue a substitute-teaching license after learning of her EEOC charge. The parties agreed that the defendant learned of the charge on September 16, 2016, and that it sent Massaro an email on September 19 requesting additional forms. They disputed whether Massaro submitted the forms, whether the defendant failed to issue the license because she did not submit them, and whether the defendant expressly denied the application or simply failed to act on it.

Because the alleged license-related conduct followed closely after the defendant learned of the EEOC charge, and because the factual disputes could support an inference of retaliation, the court held that Massaro met her initial burden on causation for the defendant’s review of the application on or after September 16, 2016. The defendant offered the absence of completed forms as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Massaro’s testimony that she was told twice that her application was denied could support a finding that this explanation was pretextual. Summary judgment was therefore improper on this portion of the claim.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Massaro’s claim that the defendant’s review of her substitute-teaching application on or after September 16, 2016, retaliated against her for filing the EEOC charge. The court otherwise granted the motion. The Clerk of Court was directed to close Docket Number 59.