Mansaray v. Krous Security Service

Background

Mohamed K. Mansaray, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Kraus Security Systems and Alfred Robinson, identified as the company’s security director. He asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Mansaray alleged that he is a Black man of African descent. Robinson hired him as a security guard in November 2018. Mansaray worked at the Twin Parks construction project in the Bronx from Tuesday through Friday because he had another job and could not work weekends. After Robinson hired Crystal Andrews, Robinson asked Mansaray to work weekends. Mansaray declined. He was then transferred to another site, Highbridge, his hours were reduced twice, and he was terminated in April 2019.

The defendants said the termination resulted from losing a construction-company contract and that several security officers would be fired. Mansaray alleged that he was replaced by guards who were not of African descent. He also alleged that Andrews had known Robinson for more than 20 years. After exhausting administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Mansaray filed this action.

Motion and legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. On that motion, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and also considered factual allegations in Mansaray’s opposition papers and declaration because he was proceeding without a lawyer.

Collective bargaining agreement

The defendants argued that Mansaray’s claims had to be dismissed because he had not exhausted the grievance and arbitration procedures in his collective bargaining agreement. The court rejected that argument. Although the agreement contained a general provision requiring compliance with federal and state antidiscrimination laws, it did not clearly and unmistakably state that Title VII claims were subject to the agreement’s grievance procedure.

The court also held that Mansaray’s claim did not arise from an interpretation or application of the agreement merely because he alleged that he had more seniority than the guards who replaced him. His claim was that the defendants discriminated against him because of national origin, not that they violated the agreement. Therefore, failure to use the agreement’s procedures was not a basis for dismissal.

Title VII discrimination claim

To state a Title VII discrimination claim, Mansaray needed to allege that he belonged to a protected group, was qualified for the job, suffered an adverse employment action, and alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive. The defendants did not dispute that Mansaray belonged to a protected group or was qualified to work as a security guard.

The court found that Mansaray adequately alleged an adverse employment action because he was terminated. The defendants’ argument that Mansaray caused his own termination by refusing assigned hours concerned the reason for the termination, not whether termination was an adverse employment action.

The court nevertheless found that Mansaray did not allege enough facts to support an inference of national-origin discrimination. He did not allege direct discriminatory comments or other direct evidence. His principal basis for an inference was that non-African guards replaced him, but the court found that the other allegations weakened that inference. The court pointed to the alleged longstanding relationship between Robinson and Andrews, the fact that Robinson hired and later fired Mansaray within about six months, and possible differences between Mansaray’s employment status and that of Andrews and another guard, Ms. Johnson.

The court concluded that, considering the pleadings as a whole, Mansaray had not stated a prima facie, or minimally supported, Title VII claim for national-origin discrimination.

Claims against Alfred Robinson

The defendants argued that Robinson could not be held individually liable under Title VII because Title VII imposes liability on employers, not individual supervisors or coworkers who were not the plaintiff’s actual employers. Mansaray conceded that Robinson was not liable under Title VII but argued that his complaint could be read to assert claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, which can permit claims against individual supervisors.

The court did not resolve that issue separately because it had already found that the operative complaint failed to state an employment-discrimination claim against any defendant. The court stated that an amended complaint should identify whether Mansaray intended to pursue claims against Robinson individually under New York state or city law.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It also granted Mansaray leave to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies, provided he had a good-faith basis for doing so. The amended complaint was due by February 19, 2021. The court stated that failure to file by that date would result in dismissal of the case with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion and mail Mansaray a copy of the order.