Wickes v. Westfair Electric Co.

Background

Patricia Wickes, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, sued West-Fair Electric Contractors, Basil Holubis, Jeffrey D’Aleo, Thomas Gresis, and George Guerra. The complaint asserted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the New York State Human Rights Law; sex discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law; retaliation; and claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Wickes alleged that after West-Fair hired her as a fifth-year apprentice mechanic in or about June 2018, she became the only woman at the worksite and experienced harassment, unequal treatment, interference with her work, retaliation, and termination because of her race, sex, and age. She also alleged that her medical insurance was canceled and that her son’s surgery was consequently canceled. She filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in February 2019 and received a notice of the right to sue dated August 26, 2019.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The court was required to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in Wickes’s favor, while disregarding legal conclusions and unsupported labels. Because Wickes represented herself, the court interpreted her allegations liberally, but it held that her complaint still had to meet minimum pleading requirements.

Race and Age Claims

The court dismissed Wickes’s Title VII race-discrimination and ADEA age-discrimination claims because she did not raise race or age in her EEOC charge. The charge checked only sex and retaliation and described alleged differences in treatment between Wickes and male coworkers. The court concluded that the race and age claims were not reasonably related to the claims presented to the agency and therefore were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The court also dismissed Wickes’s New York State Human Rights Law race- and age-discrimination claims. Although those state claims did not independently require exhaustion, the court concluded that allowing identical claims to proceed after dismissing the corresponding federal claims would improperly circumvent the exhaustion requirement.

The court dismissed the Section 1981 race-discrimination claim because Wickes did not allege facts showing intentional racial discrimination, disparate treatment compared with similarly situated non-Native American employees, or discrimination involving an activity protected by Section 1981. The court also stated that any Section 1981 retaliation claim failed because the complaint did not show that Wickes engaged in protected activity related to race.

Individual Defendants and Timeliness

The court held that individuals cannot be held liable under Title VII. It therefore dismissed Wickes’s Title VII sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against Holubis, D’Aleo, Gresis, and Guerra. The court allowed the corresponding New York State Human Rights Law sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against the individual defendants to remain because individuals may be personally liable under that statute when they participate in the alleged conduct.

The defendants argued that claims based on conduct before April 16, 2018 under Title VII, and before November 18, 2016 under the New York State Human Rights Law, were untimely. The court stated that conduct before April 16, 2018 was not actionable under either statute as pleaded. However, construing the complaint liberally, it allowed Wickes’s Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law sex-discrimination and retaliation allegations to proceed to discovery, subject to the court’s stated limitations and without preventing the defendants from renewing their timeliness and exhaustion arguments later in the case or at trial.

ERISA Claims

The court construed Wickes’s reference to “ARISA Law” as asserting an ERISA claim for denial of benefits and an ERISA retaliation claim. It dismissed the denial-of-benefits claim because the collective bargaining agreement identified the Joint Industry Board as the administrator of the medical-benefit plan. Under the court’s analysis, West-Fair could not be liable for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) where a separate plan administrator had been designated. The court also dismissed the ERISA retaliation claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege that any defendant had the power to affect Wickes’s benefits or acted with the specific intent to interfere with her benefit rights.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. With prejudice, the court dismissed Wickes’s claims for race discrimination under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and Section 1981; age discrimination under the ADEA and the New York State Human Rights Law; retaliation to the extent asserted under the ADEA and Section 1981; ERISA violations; and Title VII sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against the individual defendants. The court directed the case to proceed to discovery on Wickes’s Title VII sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against West-Fair and her New York State Human Rights Law sex-discrimination and retaliation claims against all defendants.