Harper v. New York City Transit Authority

Background

Chad Harper sued the New York City Transit Authority, William Creel, John Hoban, and Shawn Blakely, alleging disability discrimination under federal, state, and local law. The court ordered the parties to submit a joint status letter and proposed case-management plan before an initial conference. The parties missed the deadline, and Harper’s attorney did not respond to the court’s order requiring Harper to explain why sanctions should not be imposed. The court sanctioned Harper’s attorney $500 and warned that the case would be dismissed unless Harper showed good cause. Harper did not do so, and the court dismissed the case on March 8, 2018, for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Nearly two and a half years later, on August 28, 2020, Harper moved under Rule 60 to reopen the case. He alleged that his attorney, David B. Calender, stopped communicating with him, failed to attend scheduled meetings, and eventually told him that he had “withdrawn” Harper’s case. Harper said he learned that the case had been dismissed only after obtaining the court file. The defendants argued that Harper was not entitled to relief under Rule 60 and that his motion was untimely.

Court’s Analysis

Rule 60(b)(3) permits relief for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, but such a motion must be filed within one year after the judgment or order. The court held that this provision did not apply because Harper alleged misconduct by his own attorney, not by an opposing party. It also held that the motion was filed more than one year after the March 8, 2018 dismissal.

Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that applies only when no other Rule 60(b) provision is available. Relief under that provision requires extraordinary circumstances, an extreme and undue hardship, and a motion filed within a reasonable time. The court stated that an attorney’s complete disappearance may qualify as an extraordinary circumstance, but a party must also show diligent efforts to get the attorney to perform his duties. The court found that Harper’s allegation that he waited a year before contacting his attorney showed that he had not made the required diligent efforts. It also held that Harper’s twenty-nine-month delay in filing the motion was not reasonable.

Rule 60(d)(3) preserves the court’s power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. The court explained that fraud on the court must seriously affect the integrity of the adjudicative process and involve more than harm to an individual litigant. It found Harper’s allegations conclusory and unsupported by evidence showing that Calender’s conduct defiled or attempted to defile the court itself.

Disposition

The court held that Harper was not entitled to relief under any Rule 60 provision he invoked. It therefore denied Harper’s motion to reopen. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion at docket entry 25. The opinion also stated that a possible legal-malpractice claim against Calender was outside the scope of this case, without deciding whether such a claim could be brought.