Hillel v. Obvio Health USA, Inc.

Background

Iris Hillel sued Obvio Health USA, Inc.; Obvio Health Pte. Ltd.; SPRIM Americas, Inc.; IQVIA, Inc.; and several individual defendants. The opinion addresses motions by IQVIA and by Prasanna Pitale, Alistair Grenfell, Dikla Shpangental, and Anand Tharmaratnam. Hillel alleged that she had worked for IMS Holdings, Inc. and Quintiles Transnational Holdings, Inc., which later combined and were renamed IQVIA. She later became chief executive officer of Obvio in August 2019, while Obvio and IQVIA were negotiating a large deal.

Hillel alleged that Tharmaratnam told Obvio personnel that she had been fired from IMS, although she said she had resigned. She also alleged that Pitale told her that Grenfell did not want her to work with IQVIA in Europe and that Shpangental would not attend meetings with Obvio if Hillel attended. Hillel claimed that these statements harmed her professional reputation, interfered with her employment, and were intended in part to undermine Obvio’s business opportunities. After Hillel was hospitalized following a car accident on March 23, 2020, Obvio terminated her employment.

Hillel asserted New York-law claims for defamation, defamation per se, and tortious interference with prospective business relations. IQVIA moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, and also moved to strike portions of the amended complaint. The four individual defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), which concerns personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6).

Personal Jurisdiction Over the Individual Defendants

The court first considered whether New York had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. Hillel relied on New York’s long-arm statute, which can permit jurisdiction over a non-New York defendant who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

The court held that Hillel could not rely on IQVIA’s New York contacts to establish jurisdiction over its employees. The court assessed each individual’s contacts separately. Pitale had traveled to New York four times for business during the relevant period, Grenfell had traveled twice, Tharmaratnam had traveled once for an unrelated meeting, and Shpangental had not traveled to New York. The court found that the amended complaint did not connect the alleged statements to those contacts. In particular, the court found no substantial relationship between Pitale’s November 2019 business trip and the alleged statements, which were allegedly made before and after that trip.

The court also rejected Hillel’s request for targeted jurisdictional discovery. It found that she had not established an initial factual basis for jurisdiction, even after amending her complaint. The court therefore dismissed the claims against Pitale, Grenfell, Shpangental, and Tharmaratnam for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Claims Against IQVIA

The court then considered Hillel’s claims against IQVIA. It held that the alleged communications fell within New York’s qualified common-interest privilege. That privilege can protect communications about a subject in which the speaker and recipient have corresponding interests, including workplace communications. The court found that IQVIA and Obvio had a significant business relationship and shared financial interests in their proposed deal, and that Hillel’s fitness to work on that deal related to those interests.

The court held that Hillel had not pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the privilege. Her allegations that the defendants acted to harm her reputation or interfere with her employment were conclusory. To the extent she alleged that IQVIA acted to undermine Obvio’s business interests, the court reasoned that this did not show that the defendants acted solely to harm Hillel, as required for common-law malice. The court also found that allegations based on speculation about the defendants’ knowledge did not plausibly show actual malice—knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false.

The court separately observed that Grenfell’s and Shpangental’s statements that they would not work with Hillel conveyed opinions rather than objectively verifiable facts. Because Pitale allegedly repeated those statements, the court stated that his related statement was also not actionable on that basis.

The court dismissed Hillel’s tortious-interference claim because she relied on the same statements to establish the required dishonest, unfair, or improper conduct. Having found that the statements could not support the defamation claims, the court found them insufficient to support this claim as well.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court denied Hillel’s request to amend her complaint again. It found that she had not proposed amendments that would cure the deficiencies and that another amendment would be futile.

Judge Loretta A. Preska granted both motions to dismiss. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action against the individual defendants were dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The same three causes of action against IQVIA were dismissed with prejudice. The court denied IQVIA’s alternative motion to strike as moot, lifted the stay on discovery, and directed the remaining parties to propose a discovery schedule.