Daly v. Westchester County Board of Legislators

Background

Dante Edoardo Daly proceeded without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee. He sued his former employer, the Westchester County Board of Legislators, over his termination effective March 1, 2018. Daly alleged that he had medical conditions including a herniated disc, stenosis, severe musculoskeletal disorder, lumbar disc disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis of both hips. He alleged that these conditions caused severe pain and other physical symptoms and that he told Board personnel about his medical issues, planned medical treatment, anticipated surgery, and need for leave.

Daly alleged that, after a change in Board leadership, Benjamin Boykin and Dennis Power questioned whether he could perform duties requiring physical travel and tried to get him to admit that he could not perform those duties. Daly alleged that he had previously performed the duties through an arrangement involving review of meeting minutes and discussions with senior staff. He was terminated less than one month after the February 2, 2018 meeting. The Board said he lacked the financial-analysis skills needed for the position and that it was going in a different direction.

Claims and legal standard

Daly’s second amended complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and unspecified New York state law. The Board moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. Because Daly was representing himself, the court read his allegations liberally but could not add facts that he had not alleged.

Americans with Disabilities Act

The court dismissed every Americans with Disabilities Act theory other than disability discrimination because Daly’s charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission identified disability discrimination but did not present theories such as failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, or retaliation. The court ruled that those other theories were outside the likely scope of the agency’s investigation and therefore had not been administratively exhausted.

The court denied dismissal of Daly’s Americans with Disabilities Act disability-discrimination claim. It concluded that his allegations plausibly suggested that the Board regarded him as having a disability that substantially limited the major life activity of working. The court also found a plausible connection between his perceived disability and termination based on the timing and substance of the February meeting and the termination less than one month later.

Rehabilitation Act

The court treated Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claims under the same standard as Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination claims. Because Daly adequately pleaded that the Board regarded him as disabled, the court allowed his Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim to proceed.

The court also allowed Daly’s Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim to proceed. It found that requesting a reasonable accommodation is protected activity and that Daly plausibly alleged he sought to continue an arrangement allowing him to perform his duties without physically attending certain meetings. The court found that termination less than one month after the alleged request was enough at the pleading stage to support a possible causal connection.

The court dismissed Daly’s Rehabilitation Act hostile-work-environment claim. It found that the alleged February interaction, an alleged attempt by Power to punch him, generalized hostility after his flu-related leave, and his termination did not amount to a workplace so permeated with disability-based hostility that it changed the terms and conditions of employment.

The court dismissed Daly’s Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim because he did not allege facts showing that he was actually disabled under the statute. The court distinguished that theory from claims based on an employer’s perception that an employee is disabled. It also found his allegation about an ergonomic chair and desk too conclusory because he did not identify how or when he made that request or to whom.

Family and Medical Leave Act

The court dismissed both possible Family and Medical Leave Act theories. Daly adequately alleged that he had worked for the Board for more than twelve months, but he did not allege that he had worked at least 1,250 hours during the twelve months before the anticipated leave. The court found that describing the job as full-time was not enough.

The court also identified separate deficiencies. For interference, Daly did not allege that the Board denied leave benefits; the leave he requested and took before termination was granted. For retaliation, he did not allege facts linking his December 2017 discussion about leave to his March 2018 termination, and the timing alone was too distant to establish causation.

New York claims

The court dismissed the New York State Human Rights Law claims and unspecified claims under New York state law because Daly did not allege that he had served a timely notice of claim. The court dismissed the New York City Human Rights Law claims because that law applies to acts occurring within New York City, and the opinion did not identify conduct occurring there.

Disposition

The court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss in part. Daly’s Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination claim, Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim, and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim were allowed to proceed to discovery. All remaining claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, New York State Human Rights Law, New York City Human Rights Law, and applicable New York state law were dismissed. The court directed the Board to answer the second amended complaint within fourteen days and stated that it would set an initial pretrial conference.