Wimberly v. Experian Information Soultions

Background

Jason Wimberly, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that Experian Information Solutions violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act. The proposed second amended complaint asserted twelve counts involving inaccurate reporting procedures, obsolete information, disclosure of credit-file information, reinsertion of deleted information, notice to information providers about disputes, disclosure-related duties, investigations, and emotional distress.

The court had previously dismissed Wimberly’s amended complaint and denied his request for a preliminary injunction, but allowed him to seek permission to amend again. The court had identified issues the proposed complaint would need to address, including how Experian’s reports were inaccurate, why the alleged inconsistencies were legally actionable, and how Experian failed to use reasonable reporting procedures. Experian opposed the motion for leave to amend.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the rule that leave to amend may be denied when the proposed amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile when the proposed claims could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because Wimberly was representing himself, the court read his allegations liberally, but explained that he still had to provide specific facts supporting plausible claims.

For Counts V and VI, Wimberly again alleged that Experian failed to disclose Automated Credit Dispute Verifications and Universal Data Forms. The court held that these claims were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because the earlier ruling had determined that those documents were not part of a consumer’s credit file for purposes of the cited disclosure provisions. Wimberly offered no new facts or compelling reason to reconsider that ruling.

For Counts I, II, X, and XI, Wimberly alleged that Experian failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy and failed to conduct reasonable investigations. The court held that these claims failed because he did not allege specific facts showing that Experian reported inaccurate or misleading information. The court also construed Count X as invoking the correct investigation provision because the provision cited in the proposed complaint did not exist as written.

For Counts III and IV, Wimberly alleged that Experian reported obsolete loan information under the federal and New York statutes. The court held that the federal reporting period began anew in June 2012 after the deferment period ended and therefore had not expired when the relevant disputes and lawsuit occurred. For the New York claim, the court declined to credit allegations that the loans had been placed for collection in 2004 or 2011 because the documents Wimberly relied on contradicted those allegations. The court concluded that the earliest disputed accounts entered collection in January 2014, so the proposed claim did not allege reporting beyond the applicable period.

For Count VII, Wimberly alleged that Experian failed to notify him when previously deleted loan information was reinserted. The court held that the statute applies only when information was deleted following a reinvestigation based on a consumer’s dispute, and Wimberly did not allege that condition. The court also held that the claim would be time-barred even if the notice requirement had been triggered.

For Count VIII, Wimberly alleged that Experian failed to notify information providers of his disputes within five business days. The court held that the allegation merely recited the legal requirement and provided no factual details supporting liability. For Count IX, Wimberly alleged that Experian failed to advise him about its obligation to disclose his files. The court held that he did not identify when or how he contacted Experian, what information was involved, or how Experian failed to comply. He also did not allege actual damages, which the court held were required under the New York statute.

For Count XII, the court construed Wimberly’s claim for mental anguish and suffering as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the alleged credit-reporting conduct was not extreme or outrageous enough to support that claim as a matter of law.

Ruling

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. The court found that every proposed count failed to state a claim and that the proposed amendments would therefore be futile. The court ordered that the case be dismissed with prejudice, directed the clerk to close the case, and terminated the motion docket entry.