Celaj v. United States

Background

A jury convicted Din Celaj of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, completed and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and three firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The firearm counts were based on alleged firearm use, brandishing, or possession during Hobbs Act robbery or attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Judge Patterson sentenced Celaj to 601 months in prison, including two consecutive 25-year firearm sentences. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court denied review.

Celaj filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to seek correction of a sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution. He initially claimed that trial counsel was ineffective by giving him improper advice about a plea offer and by preventing him from testifying. He later added claims concerning counsel’s stipulation to an interstate-commerce fact, counsel’s failure to seek questioning under oath of a juror and prosecutor who had an outside conversation about the case, and an alleged conflict of interest.

Ineffective-Assistance Claims

The court held that the three added claims were filed after the one-year deadline and did not relate back to the original claims. Although all involved alleged ineffective assistance during the same criminal case, the court found that the later claims were based on different facts and did not share a common factual core with the original plea-advice and testifying claims. The court therefore denied the three added claims as time-barred.

For the plea-advice claim, Celaj and his trial lawyer submitted conflicting sworn accounts. Celaj said counsel did not adequately explain that rejecting the government’s plea offer could lead to additional charges and a much higher mandatory sentence. Counsel said he explained the consequences and that Celaj rejected the offer. The court found Celaj’s account sufficiently credible, particularly given the large difference between the proposed 22-year sentence and the sentence exposure after the indictment was superseded, to require an evidentiary hearing. The court did not decide at this stage whether Celaj will ultimately prove ineffective assistance.

The court denied the claim that counsel prevented Celaj from testifying. It recognized that the decision whether to testify belongs personally to the defendant and that Celaj offered evidence supporting his account of being denied that choice. But the court concluded that Celaj could not show a reasonable probability that his testimony would have changed the verdict. His proposed testimony would have characterized the conduct as burglaries rather than robberies, denied firearm use, and attacked the credibility of government witnesses and agents. The court found that this account was uncorroborated and contradicted by substantial trial evidence, including cooperating-witness testimony and recorded conversations.

Firearm Convictions Under Section 924(c)

Section 924(c) imposes penalties when a firearm is used, carried, or possessed during and in relation to a federal crime of violence. The statute’s elements clause covers an offense that requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Its separate residual clause, which asked whether an offense involved a substantial risk of physical force, was held unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis.

The court rejected the government’s argument that Celaj had procedurally defaulted his challenge by failing to raise it on direct appeal. It concluded that then-existing Second Circuit precedent had foreclosed the argument and that later Supreme Court decisions supplied sufficient cause for the failure to raise it earlier.

The court held that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause. It therefore rejected Celaj’s challenge to the firearm conviction connected to completed Hobbs Act robbery.

The court reached the opposite conclusion for attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Under the categorical approach, the court examined the minimum conduct needed for a conviction rather than the specific facts of Celaj’s offenses. Federal attempt law requires intent to commit the target offense and a substantial step toward committing it. A substantial step can include nonviolent conduct such as scouting the target or possessing robbery equipment. Because the government need not prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened physical force to establish every attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause.

Disposition

The court vacated Celaj’s convictions on Counts V and VII, the two § 924(c) convictions tied to attempted Hobbs Act robbery. It held that Celaj was entitled to be resentenced but postponed resentencing until after resolution of the plea-advice claim, because that claim could also affect the sentence. The court scheduled a telephone conference to discuss the evidentiary hearing on that claim.