Stone v. Annucci

Background

John Stone filed a petition challenging his New York State conviction for first-degree assault and his sentence of 22 years followed by five years of supervised release. He filed the petition without a lawyer. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Parker, who recommended denying the petition. After Stone objected, Judge Caproni reviewed the report and recommendation and adopted it in full.

The underlying trial involved the stabbing of Lance Smallwood. Smallwood testified that he recognized Stone as the attacker. Detective McCrosson also testified that, after speaking with a police officer and Stone’s estranged wife, he performed computer checks on a suspected person. Stone argued that this testimony implied that his estranged wife had identified him as the attacker, even though she did not testify, and that the testimony violated the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause. The trial court struck the challenged testimony, instructed the jury to disregard it, and denied Stone’s motion for a mistrial.

After the verdict, Stone also sought a hearing based on an affidavit alleging that Smallwood interacted with jurors in a way suggesting a prior relationship with one of them. The trial court denied that request without a hearing. Stone’s state appeals were unsuccessful.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed Stone’s objections under the standards governing objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. It found that some of Stone’s objections raised arguments that he had not previously presented to Judge Parker and that the remaining objections largely repeated his earlier arguments. The court therefore reviewed the report primarily for clear error, while also addressing some arguments independently.

Confrontation Clause claim. The court held that the state courts had not unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. It agreed that Detective McCrosson’s testimony was ambiguous because he did not expressly say that Stone’s estranged wife had identified Stone as the attacker. The court also agreed that the jury could have inferred that the detective learned about Stone from Smallwood’s interactions with law enforcement rather than from Stone’s wife. This made the testimony different from the directly incriminating statement at issue in Bruton v. United States. The court further held that, even if the trial court had erred, the error was harmless because Smallwood knew Stone and testified that he was certain of his identification.

Juror misconduct claim. The court agreed that an alleged error in a state post-conviction proceeding generally cannot support federal relief because federal law does not require states to provide that type of post-conviction procedure. The court also considered the claim as a possible Sixth Amendment challenge to the right to an impartial jury. It found no clear error in Judge Parker’s conclusion that Stone had not shown a Sixth Amendment violation or an adequate basis for a hearing.

Evidence claim. The court agreed that Stone’s claims concerning insufficient evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt had not been exhausted in state court. It held that those claims could not support federal relief unless Stone showed a legally sufficient reason for the failure to raise them and resulting prejudice, or actual innocence. The court found that Stone had not made the required showing. It also noted that the state appellate court had described Smallwood as identifying Stone and being sure of that identification.

Disposition

Judge Caproni adopted Judge Parker’s report and recommendation in full and denied Stone’s petition. The clerk was directed to terminate pending deadlines and motions and close the case. The opinion also directed the clerk to mail a copy to Stone.