Gondolfo v. Town of Carmel

Background

In August 2018, New York SMSA Limited Partnership, doing business as Verizon Wireless, and Homeland Towers, LLC applied to the Town of Carmel Planning Board for approval to build two wireless telecommunications facilities. The Planning Board denied the applications in October 2019.

The Wireless Defendants then sued the Town of Carmel and related defendants in federal court under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That lawsuit ended in a settlement under which the Town agreed to issue permits for a facility on Dixon Road and a facility on Walton Drive instead of Croton Falls Road. Judge Philip M. Halpern entered a stipulation of settlement and consent order in May 2020.

On October 20, 2020, Jessica Gondolfo, Robert Cavallaro, Todd McCormack, Edward Wechsler, Joseph Armisto, and Gerard Hanrahan brought a state-court proceeding against the Town Defendants, the Wireless Defendants, and Maple Hill Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the consent order on state-law grounds. They alleged that the Town lacked authority to approve the Walton Drive facility without additional review and that the approval violated New York Town Law, the State Environmental Quality Review Act, other state laws, the Town Code, and the Town Zoning Code.

The defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction. The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction blocking construction. The Wireless Defendants separately moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Jurisdiction Analysis

Federal courts generally may hear a removed case only if the plaintiff’s complaint could originally have been filed in federal court. The defendants relied on federal-question jurisdiction. The court noted that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because the plaintiffs and several defendants were citizens of New York.

The plaintiffs’ complaint pleaded only state and local law claims. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had avoided federal jurisdiction by artfully pleading their claims, that the Telecommunications Act completely preempted the claims, and that deciding the claims would necessarily require resolving federal issues.

The court rejected those arguments. It explained that the Telecommunications Act did not completely preempt the plaintiffs’ claims and did not expressly authorize removal of them. The possibility that the defendants would raise federal preemption as a defense also did not create federal-question jurisdiction. A federal defense generally cannot support removal, even when the defense is expected to be central to the dispute.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims did not necessarily raise a substantial federal issue. The fact that a state court might need to consider the Telecommunications Act in addressing a defense did not transform the plaintiffs’ claims into federal claims.

Prior Federal Consent Order

The defendants argued that removal was proper because the state case was an improper collateral attack on a federal consent order. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the federal court’s authority to protect or enforce its prior order could not substitute for original federal jurisdiction over the state-court case.

The defendants also argued that a state-court ruling could conflict with the federal consent order. The court treated that possibility as a defense, not as an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The fact that the plaintiffs sought to invalidate an order entered in a federal case likewise did not make the case removable.

The defendants further argued that the plaintiffs should have sought relief in the earlier federal case by intervening or moving to modify or vacate the consent order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court stated that the plaintiffs’ possible ability to use those procedures did not create federal jurisdiction. It also stated that there is no duty to intervene in a lawsuit. The court expressed no view on whether the plaintiffs would satisfy the standard for a nonparty Rule 60(b) motion.

Disposition

Judge Cathy Seibel held that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint pleaded only state-law issues. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. It denied as moot the plaintiffs’ alternative motion for a preliminary injunction and denied as moot the Wireless Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Clerk was directed to remand the case to New York State Supreme Court, Putnam County.

The court did not decide whether the plaintiffs’ state-law challenges were valid or whether the consent order could ultimately be invalidated.