McDonald v. Citibank N.A.
- Colleen McMahon
- 1:21-cv-00298
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
In McDonald v. Citibank N.A., Judge McMahon transferred the foreclosure lawsuit to Colorado because venue lay there rather than in New York.
Reed K. McDonald, Citibank N.A., and Shana Kloek are affected because the action was transferred from the Southern District of New York to the District of Colorado, and the New York case was closed. McDonald was also denied permission to appeal without paying fees.
What happened
In McDonald v. Citibank N.A., Reed K. McDonald, representing himself, sued Citibank N.A. and Shana Kloek over alleged constitutional violations connected to foreclosure proceedings involving Colorado real estate.
The court held that the case belonged in the District of Colorado because the property and the events underlying the claims were in Arapahoe County, Colorado. McDonald’s reasons for filing in New York did not establish that venue was proper there.
Chief Judge Colleen McMahon ordered the case transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and closed the case in New York. She also denied permission to appeal without paying fees because the court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- McDonald v. Citibank N.A. · No. 1:21-cv-00298
- Colleen McMahon
- Feb. 5, 2021
Background
Reed K. McDonald, appearing without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. He alleged that Citibank N.A. and Shana Kloek violated his constitutional rights in foreclosure proceedings involving real estate in Arapahoe County, Colorado. The opinion states that McDonald had filed related actions in Colorado state and federal courts concerning the foreclosure, sale, and eviction involving that property.
McDonald paid the filing fees and argued that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York because Citibank was headquartered in New York City, the mortgage loan’s purchase contract was governed by New York law, and Colorado courts and judges had not enforced the laws related to his claims.
Venue Analysis
The court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which generally permits a civil action to be brought where a defendant resides, where a substantial part of the relevant events occurred or the relevant property is located, or, in limited circumstances, where a defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The court also noted that an individual resides where domiciled and that an entity resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.
The court concluded that McDonald had not alleged that all defendants resided in New York or that a substantial part of the relevant events occurred there. Instead, the claims arose from the foreclosure and eviction involving property in Arapahoe County, which is in the District of Colorado. The court therefore concluded that venue lay in the District of Colorado under § 1391(b)(2).
Disposition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the court transferred the action to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The court directed the Clerk of Court to mail McDonald a copy of the order, note service on the docket, and transfer the action. The order states that the case was closed in the Southern District of New York.
The court also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying the required fees. The transfer order addressed venue and did not decide the underlying constitutional claims.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.