Williams v. Essex

Background

Andrew Williams, representing himself and proceeding without paying filing fees, sued employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenged what he described as a delayed release from Woodbourne Correctional Facility in December 2016. The defendants named in the amended complaint included E. Novoa, F. Foster, Paul Essex, R. Watkins, the New York State Board of Examiners for Sex Offenders, Steve Whitbeck, Dawn Amsler, Edwin Elffied, Mark Osborne, and Stephen Webster.

Williams alleged four constitutional claims: cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, denial of procedural due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and retaliation under the First Amendment. He alleged that he was granted parole in June 2015, that an approved residence was identified, and that he remained incarcerated until December 13, 2016. He also alleged that his sex-offender classification was later changed from level three to level two by a New York appellate court.

Only Novoa and Essex—the served defendants—had appeared when the court ruled. They moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses the court’s jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Jurisdictional rulings

The court held that any state-law claims against the served defendants were barred by New York Correction Law § 24 because Williams did not allege that they acted outside the scope of their employment. The court therefore dismissed any such claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court stated that this ruling did not affect Williams’s federal claims.

The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Williams’s § 1983 claims seeking compensatory damages from Novoa and Essex in their official capacities. Those claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). The ruling did not affect the federal claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.

Federal claims against the served defendants

The court first ruled that Williams had not adequately alleged that Novoa or Essex was personally involved in a constitutional violation. The court found that Novoa’s alleged conduct—discussing Williams’s parole officer, telling Williams’s stepsister that Williams could not live with a minor, and discussing Williams’s decision to remain incarcerated for surgery—did not plausibly show that she prevented his release. As to Essex, the court found that allegations that he said he would look into Williams’s delayed release, received calls from others, and failed to follow up did not, without more, establish personal involvement.

The court separately identified deficiencies in each claim. The Eighth Amendment claim failed because Williams was not held beyond his maximum sentence. The court stated that his maximum release date was November 26, 2035, and that even the sentence information alleged in his complaint would have produced an earliest maximum release date in 2027.

The procedural due-process claim also failed. The court assumed, without deciding, that Williams had a protected liberty interest in an open parole release date. But the complaint did not explain what constitutionally inadequate procedure caused his delayed release. The court stated that an alleged violation of state law or regulations, without more, does not establish a federal due-process violation.

The equal-protection claim failed because Williams did not identify specific comparable prisoners who were treated differently. His allegations referred generally to similarly situated prisoners but did not describe any comparator with enough detail.

The retaliation claim failed because Williams’s allegations were conclusory. Even assuming that his decision to remain incarcerated for surgery was protected conduct, he did not adequately allege when the adverse action occurred, what role Novoa or Essex played, a connection between his conduct and the delay, the earliest date he could have been released after surgery, or whether the defendants had authority to keep him incarcerated.

Disposition

The court granted the served defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. Williams was permitted to file a second amended complaint within 30 days addressing the identified pleading deficiencies. The court stated that if he did not file one within that period, the claims against the served defendants would be dismissed with prejudice. The court did not reach the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument. It also stated that any related request for declaratory relief was dismissed because the federal claims against the served defendants had been dismissed. The opinion further noted that the court would issue an additional order concerning service on certain defendants who had not appeared.