Negron v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Jocelyne Negron sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the Social Security Administration’s decision that she was not disabled. She alleged disability beginning July 28, 2016, the date of her benefits application. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Elias Feuer found that Negron had severe impairments including depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and low back pain syndrome, but that she was not disabled.

The administrative law judge found that Negron could perform light work with limits on sitting, standing, walking, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, interaction with other people, tandem work, and assembly-line work. He found that she could not perform her past relevant work but could perform other jobs, including advertising material distributor and routing clerk.

Issues

Negron argued that the administrative law judge:

- failed to account properly for the effects of obesity, asthma, back and knee pain, standing and walking limitations, and vision problems; - improperly evaluated whether her mental impairments met or equaled Listings 12.04 or 12.06; - improperly rejected part of a consulting psychologist’s opinion that she had moderate limitations in maintaining a schedule; - relied on vocational-expert testimony that conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; and - incorrectly found that she had enough English ability to perform work in the national economy.

The Commissioner argued that the administrative law judge applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the decision. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as enough to support a conclusion.

Analysis and holdings

Physical impairments and residual functional capacity. The court concluded that the administrative law judge adequately considered Negron’s obesity. Although the medical records repeatedly described her as overweight or obese, they did not show that her weight caused additional work-related limitations or worsened her back, knee, or mental conditions. The court found that the administrative law judge reasonably relied on treatment records and examinations showing, among other things, normal gait, no assistive device, generally normal examinations, and the ability to perform household activities.

The court also upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of the consulting physician’s opinions. The administrative law judge gave the opinions significant weight but did not adopt every recommended restriction. The court found adequate support for declining to include asthma-trigger restrictions because the asthma was described as mild and intermittent, examinations generally showed clear lungs, and there was no asthma hospitalization during the relevant period. The court likewise found support for rejecting a two-hour standing-and-walking limit because the record showed limited orthopedic treatment, generally normal examinations, sporadic complaints, and daily activities such as shopping and household chores.

Although the administrative law judge did not expressly discuss the consulting physician’s recommendation concerning fine visual acuity, the court concluded that the decision and record showed why no vision-related restriction was included. Negron had not identified vision problems as a basis for disability, and the record did not show that her vision prevented basic work activities. The court therefore found no need to send the case back for further consideration of the physical residual functional capacity.

Mental impairments. The court concluded that the administrative law judge properly evaluated Listings 12.04 and 12.06, which address depressive, bipolar, related, and anxiety disorders. The administrative law judge found mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information; moderate limitations in interacting with others; mild limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace; and moderate limitations in adapting or managing oneself. The court found that these findings were supported by treatment notes and consulting examinations showing generally normal cognitive functioning, improvement with medication and therapy, and no more than mild or moderate functional limitations.

The court also upheld the decision not to include a moderate schedule-maintenance limitation from consulting psychologist Arlene Broska’s opinion. The administrative law judge explained that other evidence showed improved sleep and symptoms with treatment, no limitation in maintaining a routine in another consulting opinion, and no episodes of decompensation. The court found that the administrative law judge adequately considered the record even though he did not expressly discuss every part of Negron’s testimony.

Vocational-expert testimony. The court rejected Negron’s argument that the advertising-material-distributor job conflicted with her four-hour standing-and-walking limit and occasional-contact restriction. The court found that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles did not specify that this job required more than four hours of standing or walking and stated that the job did not require significant contact with people. Because the hypothetical questions given to the vocational expert reflected restrictions supported by substantial evidence, the administrative law judge was entitled to rely on the expert’s testimony.

English skills. The court upheld the finding that Negron had sufficient English skills for work at the most basic language level considered by the vocational evidence. The record included her statements that she could read, understand, and write more than her name in English; her school history through ninth grade; her completion of a benefits form; her prior housekeeping work; and treatment notes indicating that she sometimes communicated with providers in English. The court recognized conflicting evidence, including Negron’s testimony that she could not read English, but held that the administrative law judge was responsible for weighing that conflict. The court also found harmless an error involving the administrative law judge’s citation to a form because other evidence supported the English-skills finding.

Disposition

Judge McCarthy recommended denying Negron’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings in its entirety. The recommendation therefore left in place the administrative law judge’s determination that Negron was not disabled. The document advised the parties that they had fourteen days to object to the recommendation and warned that failing to object could waive later appellate review of an order or judgment based on it.