Bell v. SL Green Realty Corp.
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:19-cv-08153
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 18
In Bell v. SL Green Realty, Judge Schofield dismissed most discrimination claims but allowed Paula Bell’s Section 1981 race claim against SL Green to proceed.
Paula Bell’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim against SL Green Realty Corp. survived. Her other claims against SL Green were dismissed, the Union’s motion to dismiss was granted, and the state-law claims against the Union were dismissed. First Quality Maintenance had already been dismissed for failure to prosecute. Bell was allowed to seek permission to amend the dismissed claims by March 4, 2021.
What happened
In Bell v. SL Green Realty Corp., Paula Bell, representing herself, sued her former employers and her union, alleging race and sex discrimination under federal, New York State, and New York City law. She alleged that supervisors treated Hispanic employees worse and fired her because she is Hispanic.
The court dismissed all claims except Bell’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim against SL Green. It dismissed the other claims against SL Green as untimely or insufficiently pleaded, granted the Union’s motion to dismiss, and declined to hear Bell’s state-law claims against the Union. The court allowed Bell to ask to amend the dismissed claims by March 4, 2021.
Judge Lorna G. Schofield ruled that Bell’s allegations about race-based comments, unequal treatment, firings, and denied bonuses were enough to let the Section 1981 claim against SL Green continue, but were not enough for her other claims.
The detailed version
- Bell v. SL Green Realty Corp. · No. 1:19-cv-08153
- Lorna Schofield
- Feb. 11, 2021
Background
Paula Bell, proceeding without a lawyer, sued SL Green Realty Corp., First Quality Maintenance, and Local 32BJ, which the opinion calls the Union. Bell alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. First Quality Maintenance had already been dismissed for failure to prosecute. The remaining defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The motions were unopposed.
Bell alleged that she was discharged on November 17, 2015, because she is Hispanic. She described race-based comments and treatment by a supervisor, including allegedly unequal enforcement of uniform rules, unequal access to breaks and refreshments, a requirement that she kneel while cleaning, denial of bonuses to Hispanic employees, and statements that no Hispanic should receive attention. The complaint also included allegations that a supervisor sexually harassed women, touched Bell’s uniform pocket, flirted with employees, and retaliated against Bell for not engaging with him.
Bell had also pursued proceedings involving the National Labor Relations Board, an arbitration, and related review. The arbitrator found that her discharge was for just cause and found no violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board deferred to the arbitration decision, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Bell’s request for reconsideration.
Claims Against SL Green
The court dismissed Bell’s Title VII race-discrimination claim as untimely. Bell’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge was filed around January 11, 2016, and her right-to-sue letter was dated May 19, 2016. Because the complaint was filed on August 29, 2019, the court concluded that the claim appeared late under Title VII’s filing deadlines. The court did not dismiss this claim with prejudice because the complaint did not state when Bell received the letter or whether facts might support extending the deadline for exceptional reasons.
The court dismissed Bell’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim because the allegations did not provide enough detail to show a severe or widespread sexually hostile work environment. The allegations that a supervisor sexually harassed and flirted with employees, took revenge against Bell, and once put a hand inside her uniform pocket lacked details about frequency, the nature of the conduct, and how it interfered with Bell’s work.
The court denied SL Green’s motion as to Bell’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim based on discrete employment actions. Section 1981 protects the right to make and enforce contracts without racial discrimination, including employment contracts. The court held that Bell plausibly alleged that she is Hispanic, that SL Green took adverse actions against her—including firing her and denying bonuses—and that those actions would not have occurred but for her race. The court also rejected SL Green’s arguments that the earlier arbitration and National Labor Relations Board proceedings barred the claim. SL Green had not shown that those proceedings decided the same race-discrimination issue or otherwise precluded Bell’s claim.
The court granted SL Green’s motion as to Bell’s Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claim. Although Bell alleged several examples of different treatment of Hispanic workers, the complaint did not provide enough information about how often or how long the conduct occurred to show that it was more than isolated or episodic.
The court dismissed all of Bell’s New York State and New York City human-rights claims against SL Green as untimely. The court reasoned that the complaint placed the alleged employment conduct before Bell’s November 2015 termination, while the applicable three-year limitations period required claims based on events after August 2016 under the filing date used in that part of the opinion.
Claims Against the Union
The court granted the Union’s motion to dismiss. Bell’s federal claims against the Union included breach of the duty of fair representation and discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981. The court found that Bell’s allegations that the Union did not provide the “right assistance” and denied her a fair opportunity to present witnesses did not identify particular Union conduct that was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The complaint also did not allege facts showing that the Union acted because of racial animus.
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over Bell’s New York State and New York City claims against the Union. It dismissed those claims because they involved a different defendant and different facts from the surviving Section 1981 claim against SL Green.
Disposition and Opportunity to Amend
The court stated that SL Green’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and that the Union’s motion was granted. All claims were dismissed except Bell’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim against SL Green. Bell was permitted to seek permission to file an amended complaint by sending a letter and proposed amended complaint by March 4, 2021, with additional facts supporting any dismissed claims. If she did not timely file such a letter, the Union would be dismissed. The clerk was directed to close the motions and mail the opinion to Bell.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.