Daugerdas v. United States

Background

Paul Daugerdas, proceeding without a lawyer, moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence. The government had charged him with conspiracy, tax evasion, obstruction of the Internal Revenue Service, and mail fraud arising from tax shelters. After an earlier conviction was vacated and a new trial was granted because of juror-bias evidence, a second jury convicted Daugerdas on seven counts in 2013. Judge Pauley later sentenced him principally to 180 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture of $164,737,500, restitution of $371,006,397, and a $700 special assessment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied review.

Claims and legal standards

Daugerdas raised nine principal arguments. Most alleged ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. He also challenged the statute-of-limitations agreements he signed before indictment, the inclusion of alleged overt acts in the sixth superseding indictment, a stipulation concerning Deutsche Bank, the sufficiency of the mail-fraud charge, and his conviction for obstructing the Internal Revenue Service under the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello v. United States. He again requested an evidentiary hearing.

For ineffective-assistance claims, the court applied the Strickland v. Washington test: the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance caused prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability of a different result. The court also applied the rule that a claim not raised on direct appeal is generally procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner shows a legally sufficient reason for not raising it and actual prejudice, or shows actual innocence.

Statute-of-limitations agreements

The court rejected Daugerdas’s argument that counsel was ineffective for advising him to sign seven agreements extending the statute of limitations for potential tax-evasion charges. The court found that the agreements were signed before the limitations periods had expired, either because later affirmative acts extended the periods or because the agreements were signed while the periods were still open. The agreements expressly stated that Daugerdas waived any statute-of-limitations defense, and counsel stated that he explained their advantages and disadvantages.

The court also rejected Daugerdas’s claim that he did not understand the agreements. It relied on their clear language, his legal and accounting experience, and its earlier finding that he signed them knowingly and voluntarily. The court found that counsel’s advice was a reasonable strategic decision. It likewise rejected the claim against appellate counsel, concluding that counsel reasonably chose not to raise the issue after presenting numerous arguments in a lengthy appeal brief.

The court rejected the argument that the agreements lacked consideration, meaning something exchanged to support an agreement. The agreements stated that Daugerdas benefited from more time to submit information and arguments and that the government benefited from additional time to investigate and decide whether to bring charges. The court also stated that, under controlling precedent, a statute-of-limitations waiver is a voluntary waiver of a defense and does not require consideration.

Indictment and Deutsche Bank arguments

The court rejected Daugerdas’s claim that the sixth superseding indictment added a new overt act and therefore broadened the charges or made them untimely. It compared the challenged allegation with the corresponding allegation in the original and earlier indictments and found that they described the same act. Because no new overt act was added, the later indictment related back to the original indictment, and counsel had no reasonable basis to object on that ground.

The court also rejected Daugerdas’s arguments concerning the Deutsche Bank stipulation and the allegation that the mail fraud affected a financial institution. It found that the War-time Suspension of Limitations Act suspended the limitations period for the conspiracy and mail-fraud charges. It further found that the stipulation was a strategic decision made during trial after counsel explained that stipulating was preferable to presenting evidence about the tax strategies’ effect on Deutsche Bank. The court stated that, even if counsel had challenged the indictment, the government could have filed another superseding indictment before the retrial, so Daugerdas could not show prejudice.

Mail-fraud charge

The court rejected Daugerdas’s claim that the mail-fraud count was defective because it did not identify specific mailings. It explained that an indictment generally need track the statutory language and provide approximate times and places when necessary. It also noted that the government had supplied a bill of particulars identifying 34 mailings it planned to prove. Because a challenge to the charge would have been frivolous and caused no prejudice, the court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.

Internal Revenue Service obstruction claim

Daugerdas argued that his obstruction conviction violated his rights to grand-jury indictment and jury trial because the government did not prove that his conduct was directed at a pending Internal Revenue Service proceeding, as required by Marinello. The court held that he procedurally defaulted this claim by not raising it on direct appeal. It found that the argument was available before the appeal ended, even though Marinello was decided later. The court also found that Daugerdas showed neither a sufficient reason for the omission and resulting prejudice nor actual innocence.

Evidentiary hearing and disposition

The court denied the renewed request for an evidentiary hearing. It found that the motion, files, and record conclusively showed that Daugerdas was not entitled to relief and that his allegations were vague, conclusory, and not a colorable ineffective-assistance claim. The court denied the § 2255 petition, declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Daugerdas had not made the required substantial showing of a constitutional violation, terminated the pending motions, and closed case number 18-cv-152.