Domingues v. Barton Chevrolet Cadillac

Background

Christine Domingues sued Barton Chevrolet and Ronald Barton under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York Human Rights Law. She alleged a hostile work environment and retaliation. Domingues testified that coworker Lucia DiCrese touched her breast on May 12, 2017, made sexual comments about her breasts, and had made similar comments during April and May. Domingues reported the conduct to supervisors and others, including Barton.

After Domingues complained to Barton on August 9, 2017, she was absent from work for about three weeks. When she returned, she was transferred from the Sales Building to the Service Building. Her hourly rate and benefits remained the same, but she testified that she worked fewer hours, could no longer work Saturdays for overtime pay, and had to perform manual work, including lifting boxes. She did not return to work after injuring her shoulder while lifting boxes.

Summary-judgment standard

The defendants sought summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court does not weigh evidence or decide disputed facts; it determines whether a reasonable jury could decide for the nonmoving party.

Title VII claims against Ronald Barton

The court held that individuals cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Because Ronald Barton was sued as an individual, the court dismissed Domingues’s Title VII claims against him. The opinion also stated that Domingues did not oppose this argument in her brief.

Title VII hostile-work-environment claim against Barton Chevrolet

The court denied summary judgment on this claim. It held that a jury could find that the May 12 incident was an extraordinarily severe single incident of sexual harassment. The court also considered Domingues’s testimony about repeated sexual comments concerning her breasts. Together, the touching and comments created a factual question about whether the workplace was objectively hostile. Domingues’s testimony about humiliation, anxiety, and panic attacks supported a factual question about whether she subjectively experienced the environment as abusive.

Because DiCrese was a coworker rather than Domingues’s supervisor, Barton Chevrolet could be liable if it was negligent in responding to known or reasonably knowable harassment. The court found that Domingues reported the conduct to supervisory employees and to Barton, and that the company’s policy gave supervisors duties to investigate and respond. Although Mayer sent DiCrese home for one day and told her that inappropriate touching was not allowed, the record showed no other discipline, and DiCrese remained in the Sales Building. The court also noted that Domingues testified that the sexual comments continued and that Domingues, rather than DiCrese, was later transferred. A reasonable jury could therefore find that Barton Chevrolet’s response was not prompt or reasonable.

Title VII retaliation claim against Barton Chevrolet

The court also denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Domingues’s complaint about sexual harassment was protected activity, and Barton Chevrolet knew about it. A jury could find that her transfer was materially adverse because it involved different and more physical duties, fewer hours, and loss of Saturday overtime opportunities, even though her hourly rate and benefits did not change. The timing of the transfer after her complaint also supported a possible causal connection. The defendants argued that the transfer was intended to prevent further interaction between Domingues and DiCrese, but the court held that a jury should decide the reason for the transfer.

New York Human Rights Law claims

The court found that the same factual disputes supporting the Title VII claims against Barton Chevrolet also supported Domingues’s New York Human Rights Law hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims. Unlike Title VII, New York law can allow individual liability when the defendant owns the employer or has authority to hire and fire, or when the defendant aids or abets unlawful discrimination. Because the parties did not dispute that Barton owned Barton Chevrolet, the court held that a jury could find Ronald Barton individually liable under the New York law claims.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing Domingues’s Title VII claims against Ronald Barton. It otherwise denied the motion. The opinion stated that all remaining claims would proceed to trial. The judge was Philip M. Halpern.