Hewes v. Democratic National Committee

Background

Henry F. Hewes, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Donna Brazile, and Robby Mook. Hewes alleged that he was a candidate for the Democratic Party’s 2016 presidential nomination and spent time and money campaigning after relying on the DNC’s public promise to remain neutral and treat candidates equally. He alleged that the defendants instead denied him party resources, failed to respond to his communications, restricted his access to data, excluded him from debates, and refused to include him in a primary for Americans abroad. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, an injunction against future similar conduct, and appointment of a trustee to oversee the DNC during the 2020 election cycle.

Hillary Clinton was previously dismissed from the case for failure to prosecute. Hewes did not oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court nevertheless examined whether the complaint was legally sufficient rather than granting the motion solely because it was unopposed.

Standing

The defendants argued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) that Hewes lacked standing, meaning the constitutional entitlement to bring a dispute in federal court. The court rejected that argument as to money damages. It concluded that Hewes alleged a concrete injury because he claimed to have lost time and money campaigning, and that injury was sufficiently connected to the defendants’ alleged denial of support after promising neutrality. The court stated that Hewes’s failure to win the 2016 nomination, standing alone, would not have been a sufficient injury, but it understood his primary claimed injury to be the time and money he allegedly would not have spent had he known of the defendants’ conduct.

The court reached a different conclusion about injunctive relief. Hewes did not allege that he was likely to suffer similar harm again, so he lacked standing to seek an injunction against future misconduct or appointment of a trustee. The request for a trustee during the 2020 election cycle was also moot because that election cycle had ended.

Failure to State a Claim

The court then considered the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. Although Hewes did not identify a legal basis for relief, the court liberally construed his allegations as asserting breach of contract and promissory estoppel under New York law. Promissory estoppel is a claim based on reasonable reliance on a clear promise that causes injury.

The court held that Hewes failed to state either claim. It found that he did not adequately describe the alleged promise that the DNC would remain neutral or provide him the same support as other candidates. The alleged promise was too vague and indefinite, and Hewes did not adequately allege an agreement, a meeting of the minds, or his performance under a contract. The court also found that none of the individual defendants was alleged to have made a promise or entered into an agreement with Hewes. Because a promise or agreement was required for both theories, the court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants and the DNC. The court further stated that any civil-conspiracy theory failed because Hewes had not alleged an underlying tort.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court denied leave to amend because Hewes had already amended his complaint twice, discussed his legal theory with the court, continued to omit the necessary allegations, and had largely stopped prosecuting the case. The Clerk was directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn remaining dates, close the case, and mail the opinion to Hewes.