Ortiz Dorta v. Commissioner Of Social Security

Background

David Ortiz Dorta applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. After the applications were denied initially and after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, Ortiz brought an action seeking judicial review. He was represented by Daniel A. Osborn of Osborn Law, P.C., and entered into a contingency-fee agreement allowing the firm to seek up to 25% of his past-due benefits if the case was remanded and he later received benefits.

The court granted Ortiz’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, the Administrative Law Judge found that Ortiz was disabled and entitled to benefits. The Social Security Administration withheld $25,273.75, representing 25% of Ortiz’s past-due benefits, for possible attorney’s fees. Osborn then moved under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for approval of that amount.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) allows a court to approve a reasonable fee for an attorney who represented a claimant in court, subject to a limit of 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The court must independently review a contingency-fee agreement, including whether the percentage is within the statutory limit and whether fraud or overreaching occurred. It must also consider the quality and results of the representation, whether the attorney unreasonably delayed the case, and whether the fee would be a windfall compared with the work performed.

Analysis

The court found that the requested fee matched the 25% contingency-fee agreement and that there was no evidence of fraud or overreaching. It also found that the reasonableness factors supported the requested fee. Osborn had reviewed a 695-page administrative record and submitted a detailed, non-boilerplate brief that resulted in a successful remand and an award of past-due benefits. The court noted that Ortiz received more than $100,000 in past-due benefits before fees, as well as ongoing future benefits, and that Osborn’s effective hourly rate of $434.26 did not create a windfall concern.

The Commissioner did not object to the fee request but argued that the court could consider Osborn’s failure to timely apply for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Osborn acknowledged that he missed the application deadline by three days. He said he had attempted to negotiate the fee with the Commissioner’s counsel and later sought consent to a short extension, but the extension was not granted and he never filed the application.

The court concluded that Ortiz should not bear the financial burden of counsel’s missed deadline. It therefore reduced the requested Section 406(b) fee by $11,803.77, which the court accepted as the amount Osborn could have recovered through a timely Equal Access to Justice Act application. The reduction was not based on a finding that the representation itself was unreasonable.

Disposition

Judge James L. Cott awarded Osborn $13,469.98 in attorney’s fees. The court directed the Clerk to close the fee-motion docket entry and mark the motion granted as modified.