Brown v. Annucci

Background

Byron K. Brown, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, sued New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and asserted state-law claims for negligence and assault and battery.

Brown alleged that correction officers assaulted him after he was ordered to return to his cell on April 6, 2019. He further alleged that Sgt. J. Deckelbaum helped cover up the assault by directing that his injuries be cleaned before photographs were taken, telling Sgt. F. Caraballo to ensure that witnesses’ stories were consistent, and authorizing a cell search to discard evidence. Brown also alleged that he received a disciplinary hearing before Dep. Supt. L. Malin, who found him guilty and imposed 60 days in the Special Housing Unit and 60 days’ loss of privileges. Brown claimed Malin failed to explain why two of his eight requested inmate witnesses were not called.

The moving defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally valid claim. Sgt. F. Caraballo and Correction Officers J. Ayala, S. Amaro, C. Rodriguez, and L. Merejo did not join the motion.

Court’s analysis

The court dismissed Brown’s official-capacity claims against Acting Commissioner Anthony Annucci for monetary and declaratory relief because those claims were barred by state immunity. The court also dismissed Brown’s Eighth Amendment medical-care claim against R.N. V. Young. Brown alleged that Young did not provide follow-up care for eye, nose, and lip injuries, but he did not allege that he was denied treatment, and the alleged injuries were not sufficiently serious under the standard applied by the court.

The court dismissed Brown’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Supt. Michael Capra and Dep. Supt. Michael Royce because Brown did not plausibly allege that they were personally involved or consciously disregarded a serious risk of harm. The court dismissed his failure-to-investigate claim against Capt. M. Barnes because failure to investigate an alleged constitutional violation does not itself establish a Section 1983 claim.

The court found that Brown plausibly alleged a liberty interest because he claimed that he was denied daily recreation during his 60 days in the Special Housing Unit. The court allowed his procedural due-process claim against Dep. Supt. L. Malin to proceed because Brown alleged that Malin did not provide a reason for refusing to call two requested witnesses. The court dismissed the due-process claims against Correction Officers T. Bowen and K. Green, R.N. Young, and Director D. Venettozzi. Allegations that witnesses gave false testimony or that Venettozzi denied an appeal did not plausibly establish their personal involvement in a constitutional violation. The court also dismissed any due-process claim against Royce based on the denial of an appeal.

The court dismissed Brown’s equal-protection claim against the moving defendants because he did not plausibly allege that their actions were motivated by intentional discrimination. It dismissed the conspiracy claims against Capt. Barnes and Correction Officers Green and Bowen because Brown did not allege facts showing an agreement among them. But it allowed the conspiracy claim against Sgt. Deckelbaum to proceed, finding that the alleged instructions to coordinate stories, clean injuries, and discard evidence plausibly indicated an agreement to cover up the alleged assault. The court also found the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine did not require dismissal at this stage because the alleged conduct was outside the normal duties of corrections employees and allegedly served their personal interests.

The court declined to grant qualified immunity—a protection from liability for officials who did not violate clearly established rights—to Deckelbaum or Malin at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It stated that the allegations sufficiently described Deckelbaum’s personal involvement and that Malin’s alleged failure to explain why two witnesses were not called could violate a clearly established due-process right.

Finally, the court dismissed Brown’s state-law negligence and assault-and-battery claims against the moving defendants because New York Correction Law § 24 immunizes covered corrections employees from personal-capacity state-law damages claims for conduct within the scope of their employment, and Brown’s allegations did not suggest that the moving defendants acted outside that scope.

Disposition

Judge Briccetti granted in part and denied in part the partial motion to dismiss. Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due-process claim against Dep. Supt. Malin and conspiracy claim against Sgt. Deckelbaum were permitted to proceed. All other claims against the moving defendants were dismissed. The court directed Malin, Deckelbaum, and the non-moving defendants to file an answer, and the Clerk was directed to terminate Annucci, Capra, Young, Green, Bowen, Barnes, Royce, and Venettozzi as defendants. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for an appeal.