Abusikin v. City of New York

Background

Garelabi Abusikin sued the City of New York, Police Officer Mirjan Lolja, and John Does 1–2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. He alleged false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and excessive force, based on events surrounding his December 11, 2016 arrest. He also alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The parties presented conflicting accounts. Abusikin said he legally parked his yellow taxi, refused requests to move it, asked what crime he had committed, and asked to speak with a supervisor. He said Lolja then arrested him and pushed him against a car to handcuff him. Defendants said the taxi occupied two lanes, blocked traffic, and that Abusikin yelled, caused a crowd to gather, and physically tried to avoid being handcuffed.

Lolja arrested Abusikin for harassment, obstructing governmental administration, and disorderly conduct. Lolja later signed a criminal complaint charging disorderly conduct. Abusikin was arraigned, released on his own recognizance, and required to appear in court. The criminal case was dismissed and sealed on March 6, 2017, under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50.

State False-Arrest Claim

The court held that Abusikin’s state false-arrest claim was untimely. State tort claims against a municipality or covered municipal employees generally required both a timely notice of claim and filing the lawsuit within one year and 90 days after accrual. The court treated the original May 23, 2018 filing as the filing date even though the Clerk later found it deficient for lack of a proper signature and Abusikin filed a corrected complaint on June 8, 2018. But May 23, 2018 was still after the March 11, 2018 deadline for the state false-arrest claim. The court therefore granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that claim.

Federal False-Arrest Claim

The court denied summary judgment on the § 1983 false-arrest claim. Probable cause—the facts and reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime had been committed—is a complete defense to false arrest. But the parties disputed facts relevant to probable cause, including whether Abusikin’s taxi blocked traffic, whether he yelled or made unreasonable noise, whether his conduct physically obstructed the officers, and whether the Complainants’ statements reasonably supported charges of menacing or harassment.

Because a jury could credit Abusikin’s account and find no probable cause under the possible disorderly-conduct, obstruction, menacing, or harassment theories, the court could not decide probable cause as a matter of law. The court also found that these factual disputes prevented summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which can protect an officer unless the officer violated a clearly established right or acted unreasonably under the circumstances.

Malicious-Prosecution Claims

The court granted summary judgment on Abusikin’s federal malicious-prosecution claim because he could not show favorable termination. Under the federal standard, the criminal case had to end in a way that affirmatively indicated his innocence. The record showed only that the case was dismissed and sealed under § 160.50; it did not explain why the dismissal occurred. The court held that this record did not affirmatively indicate innocence.

The court denied summary judgment on the state malicious-prosecution claim. It held that New York uses a lower favorable-termination standard: the criminal case must end in a way that is not inconsistent with the accused person’s innocence. The court concluded that dismissal and sealing under § 160.50, without evidence that the dismissal was inconsistent with innocence, satisfied that standard. The court also found factual disputes about probable cause and therefore about malice, another element of malicious prosecution.

The court further concluded that a jury could find that Lolja initiated the criminal proceeding because he signed the criminal complaint, used information he allegedly observed, and had Abusikin arraigned. Abusikin’s state malicious-prosecution claim therefore remained for trial.

Immunity

Defendants sought qualified immunity on the federal claims and governmental immunity on the state claims. The court held that summary judgment on these immunity issues was inappropriate because the facts confronting Lolja, the reasonableness of relying on the Complainants’ statements, and the existence of probable cause were disputed. The court stated that the state governmental-immunity analysis was similarly dependent on whether Lolja acted reasonably in determining that probable cause existed.

Abandoned Claims and Disposition

The court granted summary judgment on Abusikin’s § 1983 excessive-force claim and on all claims against the John Doe defendants because Abusikin did not address those claims or Defendants’ arguments about them in his opposition brief.

Overall, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to the state false-arrest claim, § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, excessive-force claim, and claims against the John Doe defendants. Abusikin’s § 1983 false-arrest claim and state malicious-prosecution claim remained for trial.