Jones-Cruz v. Rivera

Background

Debra Jones-Cruz, a physician assistant in Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center’s Neurology Department, sued Victor Rivera, Local 1199 SEIU, and the Hospital. She alleged race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also alleged that Rivera tortiously interfered with her employment contract.

Jones-Cruz alleged that night shifts were preferable because they paid more and involved fewer emergencies and less stress. She claimed that Rivera intervened in the scheduling process to benefit White physician assistants, while minority physician assistants were confined to day shifts. She also alleged that Rivera spoke to her in a condescending and insulting manner and that she experienced physical and emotional symptoms as a result.

The Union Defendants and the Hospital moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state legally sufficient claims.

Labor-law preemption

The Union Defendants argued that Jones-Cruz’s state and city discrimination claims, as well as her tortious-interference claim, were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because resolving them would require interpreting the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Hospital.

The court held that the state and city discrimination claims were not preempted. Although the collective bargaining agreement could be consulted to confirm seniority rules, the court concluded that the central issue was whether defendants discriminated against Jones-Cruz by favoring White coworkers, not whether defendants properly followed the agreement. The court also declined to find the tortious-interference claim preempted because the complaint did not provide facts about the alleged employment contract.

The court therefore denied the motions to dismiss to the extent they were based on labor-law preemption.

Race-discrimination claims under Section 1981 and New York State law

The court held that the complaint did not adequately allege an adverse employment action. A less desirable schedule, without more, generally is not a significant change in employment terms. Although Jones-Cruz alleged that night shifts paid more, she did not allege that she actually lost income because of the scheduling change.

The court also held that the complaint did not adequately allege discriminatory intent. Jones-Cruz alleged that Rivera favored White physician assistants, but she did not provide facts showing that the scheduling change was based on race beyond identifying herself as Black and the other physician assistants as White. The court also noted that Jones-Cruz was hired for the day shift, while the White physician assistants were hired for the night shift, and that the complaint did not allege that she had sought a night shift when those employees were hired.

The court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section 1981 and New York State Human Rights Law claims.

New York City Human Rights Law claim

The court recognized that the New York City Human Rights Law is interpreted more broadly than the federal and state discrimination laws. Even under that broader standard, however, Jones-Cruz had to plausibly allege that race was a motivating factor in the scheduling decisions.

The court concluded that the complaint’s assertion that Rivera favored White physician assistants was conclusory and did not plausibly connect the scheduling decisions to race. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the New York City Human Rights Law claim.

Tortious-interference claim

To state a claim for tortious interference with contract, Jones-Cruz had to allege a valid contract with a third party, Rivera’s knowledge of the contract, intentional procurement of a breach without justification, an actual breach, and resulting damages.

The complaint alleged only that Rivera interfered with Jones-Cruz’s employment contract with the Hospital. It did not provide facts identifying the contract, showing that Rivera knew about it, or alleging that it was breached. The court dismissed the tortious-interference claim for failure to state a claim.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court concluded that it could not determine that amendment would necessarily be futile. It therefore granted Jones-Cruz leave to amend. Any motion for leave to file an amended complaint was to be served and filed by March 29, 2021, with the proposed amended complaint attached.

The court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate those motions.