Turner v. McDonough

Background

Ronald G. Turner sued Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. McDonough was automatically substituted for the originally named defendant, Robert L. Wilkie, after McDonough became Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The opinion states that an earlier decision granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. That earlier decision dismissed Turner’s retaliation claims in their entirety but allowed his Title VII race-discrimination claim to proceed to trial.

After that earlier decision, the court considered whether Turner could pursue race-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and whether he should receive additional discovery. Turner was proceeding without a lawyer. The opinion also states that the court had appointed pro bono counsel for him, but no lawyer had volunteered to represent him at trial as of the date of the order.

New York State Human Rights Law Claims

The court held that Turner could not pursue his race-discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law. It relied on the rule that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The court dismissed Turner’s New York State Human Rights Law claims from the action.

The court explained that the issue implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the court’s authority to hear the claims. It stated that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. The court also clarified that this dismissal did not change the earlier ruling on Turner’s Title VII claims: his retaliation claims remained dismissed, while his Title VII race-discrimination claim was to proceed to trial.

Requests to Reopen Discovery

Turner had asked the court to reopen discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)(2) and Rule 56(e)(1). Rule 56(d)(2) can allow additional discovery when a party opposing summary judgment shows that specified facts needed to oppose the motion cannot yet be presented. The court found that Turner had more than enough time and opportunity to conduct discovery because discovery deadlines had been extended several times and he had received assistance from pro bono counsel for certain depositions.

The court also found that Turner had not provided specific reasons why he could not obtain the requested discovery during the discovery period. It therefore denied his request under Rule 56(d)(2).

The court separately denied the request under Rule 56(e)(1). It explained that this rule may allow a party another opportunity to support or address a factual assertion, but it is not intended to reopen completed discovery. The court further stated that Turner had not explained why additional discovery was needed to support his opposition concerning his retaliation claim, and that the proposed discovery did not appear likely to provide meaningful support for that claim or overcome the defendant’s summary-judgment motion.

Disposition

Judge Andrew E. Krause ordered that Turner’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law were dismissed and that his requests to reopen discovery were denied. The court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees for that appeal. The clerk was directed to mail a copy of the order to Turner.