Alexander v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Background

Jeriel Alexander, proceeding without a lawyer, sued JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He alleged that, on March 22, 2018, he visited a Chase branch in Stratford, Connecticut, with his sister and sought to withdraw $3,330. According to the complaint, a teller asked for his driver’s license and Social Security card, said she needed to run a criminal background check, and later said she could not process the request because Alexander is Black. Alexander alleged that he complained to Chase and that Chase later deposited money into his account as an attempted bribe to discourage him from pursuing litigation. He sought $25 million in damages.

Chase moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Alexander opposed the motion.

Title II claim

The court dismissed the Title II claim with prejudice. Title II prohibits racial discrimination in listed places of public accommodation. The court held that the statutory list is exhaustive and does not include banks. Therefore, the alleged conduct at a bank branch could not satisfy Title II’s requirement that the discrimination occur in a covered public accommodation.

The court also held that the Title II claim failed because Alexander sought monetary damages. According to the court, Title II generally provides injunctive relief—an order requiring unlawful conduct to stop—and attorney’s fees, rather than damages. Alexander did not allege a real and imminent risk of repeated discrimination that could support an injunction.

Section 1981 claim

The court treated Alexander’s racial-discrimination allegations relating to a commercial transaction as also asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. That statute protects the right to make and enforce contracts without racial discrimination. A customer generally must allege intentional racial discrimination affecting the transaction, such as being prevented from completing it or being required to complete it on terms imposed on minority customers but not others.

The court found that Alexander alleged a delay and a request for identification but did not allege that he was ultimately prevented from withdrawing his money or forced to do so on different terms. The complaint did not describe what happened after the branch manager became involved. The court therefore dismissed the Section 1981 claim without prejudice and allowed Alexander to amend it with additional facts.

State-law claims and other allegations

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—after dismissing the federal claims. It dismissed any state-law claims without prejudice unless Alexander could properly allege a Section 1981 claim in an amended complaint. The court noted that New York’s commercial-bribery statute does not provide a private civil cause of action, according to the authorities it discussed. The court also stated that even treating the bribery allegation as a claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act would not cure the lack of supporting factual detail.

Disposition

Judge Ona T. Wang granted Chase’s motion to dismiss. The Title II claim was dismissed with prejudice. The Section 1981 and state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. Alexander was granted leave to file an amended complaint addressing the Section 1981 claim by May 3, 2021; the court stated that failure to do so would result in dismissal for failure to prosecute.