Patrick v. Local 51, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO
- Nelson Roman
- 7:19-cv-10715
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Patrick v. Local 51, Judge Roman denied Patrick’s motion to reconsider vacating defendants’ default, allowing the case to continue.
Rita Patrick, Local 51, the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, and Shonequa Johnson-Duggins. The ruling left in place the earlier order vacating the defendants’ defaults and allowed the case to proceed under a revised scheduling plan.
What happened
In Patrick v. Local 51, Rita Patrick alleged that Local 51, the American Postal Workers Union, and its president removed her from her elected shop steward position because she raised concerns about union finances. She brought claims under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and for breach of contract under state law.
The defendants initially failed to respond on time, and the Clerk entered defaults against them. The court later vacated those defaults after finding that the failure was not willful, the defendants had potentially valid defenses, and vacating the defaults would not prejudice Patrick. Patrick asked the court to reconsider that decision.
Judge Nelson S. Roman denied the reconsideration motion. He reaffirmed that the defendants had potentially valid defenses to both the statutory and contract claims, while explaining that this finding did not mean the defendants would ultimately win.
The detailed version
- Patrick v. Local 51, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO · No. 7:19-cv-10715
- Nelson Roman
- Mar. 22, 2021
Background
Rita Patrick, a member of Local 51, sued Local 51, the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, and Local 51’s president, Shonequa Johnson-Duggins. Patrick alleged that Johnson-Duggins suspended her from her elected shop steward position after Patrick raised concerns about alleged financial discrepancies and irregularities in Local 51’s bank accounts. Patrick asserted claims under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, including claims involving free speech, due process, and retaliation, as well as a state-law breach-of-contract claim.
Patrick filed the action on November 19, 2019. After the defendants did not timely respond, the Clerk entered certificates of default. The defendants then answered and moved to vacate the defaults and obtain permission to file their answer. In a May 6, 2020 order, the court granted that motion, finding that the defaults were not willful, that the defendants had meritorious defenses, and that vacating the defaults would not prejudice Patrick. Patrick then moved for reconsideration, challenging the finding that the defendants had meritorious defenses.
Reconsideration standard
The court explained that reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy generally available only in exceptional circumstances. It is not a way to present new theories or take a second opportunity to argue the case. Generally, the moving party must identify controlling decisions or information that the court overlooked.
The court also explained that a defense is “meritorious” for purposes of vacating a default if the defendant’s version of events presents facts that, if proven, could constitute a complete defense. The defense need not be ultimately persuasive at this stage; the standard is a low threshold.
LMRDA defenses
Patrick argued that the defendants could not rely on a defense based on her allegedly knowingly false statements about union accounts and expenditures. The court recognized that Second Circuit precedent generally protects criticism of union management under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, even when the criticism is libelous or slanderous. But the court also relied on authority indicating that knowingly false or misleading statements may, in certain circumstances, fall outside the statute’s protection.
The court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that the defendants’ allegation that Patrick knowingly made false statements was a meritorious defense for purposes of vacating the default. The court emphasized that this conclusion did not mean the defense would ultimately succeed. The court also noted a separate defense that Patrick was suspended for failing to fulfill her responsibilities, rather than because of her expressive activity. Patrick had not challenged that second defense, which independently supported the defendants’ position on the statutory claims.
Breach-of-contract defense
Patrick argued that the defendants lacked a meritorious defense to her claim based on Article 17 of Local 51’s constitution and bylaws. Article 17 requires the president to give written notice explaining the reason for removing a person from a position. The defendants asserted that Patrick was suspended with pay, not removed from her position, so Article 17 did not apply. The court held that this assertion supplied a meritorious defense at the default-vacatur stage.
Ruling and effect
Judge Nelson S. Roman affirmed the earlier finding that the defendants had meritorious defenses. Because the court’s findings that the defaults were not willful and that vacating them would not prejudice Patrick were uncontested, the court concluded that vacating the defaults was appropriate and denied Patrick’s motion for reconsideration. The court directed the parties to submit a revised case-management plan and scheduling order and directed the Clerk to terminate the reconsideration motion.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.