Shutsha v. NYPD Sgt. Cao

Background

Sekou Shutsha, who was detained at the time on unrelated charges, filed a complaint without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by state or local officials. He alleged that on June 14, 2014, NYPD Sergeant Ip searched his luggage on a southbound A train arriving at the 59th Street-Columbus Circle Station in Manhattan. He alleged that NYPD Sergeant Cao was present but did not stop the search. Shutsha alleged that a criminal court granted his motion to suppress the evidence in January 2018 after finding a lack of an emergency justifying the search. He sought damages for loss of freedom, reputational injury, and pain and suffering.

Screening standard

Because Shutsha was a prisoner seeking relief from government defendants, the court screened the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court explained that it must dismiss claims that are frivolous, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, seek money from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court's jurisdiction. The court also explained that pleadings filed without a lawyer receive a generous reading but still must provide enough facts to make a claim plausible.

Claims against the NYPD

The court stated that the NYPD, as an agency of New York City, is not a suable entity. It said that claims against the NYPD must instead be brought against the City of New York. The court further explained that a claim against the City under § 1983 requires facts showing that a city policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation. The complaint did not allege facts suggesting that a City policy caused the alleged search. The court directed that Shutsha should not name the NYPD as a defendant if he files an amended complaint.

Timeliness

The court treated the alleged unlawful search as a Fourth Amendment claim. It explained that § 1983 claims in New York generally use a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims and generally accrue when the person knows, or has reason to know, of the injury. The court concluded that the claim accrued on the date of the search, June 14, 2014, rather than when the criminal court suppressed the evidence in 2018. Because Shutsha filed his complaint in December 2020, approximately six years after the search, the claim appeared to be barred by the statute of limitations and subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Disposition

The court granted Shutsha leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days. The amended complaint had to provide facts supporting each claim against each defendant and facts concerning the timeliness of the action, including any basis for equitable tolling. Equitable tolling can extend a filing deadline when the claimant pursued rights diligently and an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. The amended complaint would replace the original complaint, so any claims or facts Shutsha wished to preserve had to be included in it. The court warned that if he did not comply within the deadline and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed as untimely.

Judge Colleen McMahon directed the Clerk to mail the order to Shutsha and denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The order did not finally decide whether Shutsha could prove an unlawful search; it allowed him an opportunity to amend before any dismissal based on untimeliness.