Larach-Cohen v. David C. Banks

Background

Linda and Rolando Cohen brought the action on behalf of their son, M.C., against the New York City Department of Education, the New York State Education Department, and Meisha Porter in her official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide M.C. with a required educational placement for the 2019–2020 school year and sought equitable relief, damages, and a declaration concerning that issue and related administrative proceedings.

M.C. is a teenager with a brain injury who is classified as a student with a disability and has an individualized education program. He attended the International Academy of Hope, or iHOPE, during the 2017–2018 school year. After an administrative hearing, an impartial hearing officer found that the school district had failed to offer M.C. an appropriate public education, that iHOPE was an appropriate unilateral placement, and that equitable considerations supported an award of tuition and related-service costs for that year. The school district did not appeal that decision.

For the 2018–2019 school year, M.C. was placed at iBRAIN by his parents. An impartial hearing officer directed the school district to fund iBRAIN as a “pendency placement,” meaning the placement that must generally be maintained and funded while an education dispute is pending. The state review officer reversed that decision, finding that the record did not establish that iBRAIN was substantially similar to iHOPE. In a prior related proceeding, this court later granted the school district’s summary-judgment motion and denied the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to pendency payments for iBRAIN for the 2018–2019 school year.

M.C. remained enrolled at iBRAIN for 2019–2020. The plaintiffs began another administrative proceeding alleging that the school district had failed to provide an appropriate public education and requested funding for iBRAIN during that proceeding. They also sought to combine the 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 proceedings, but that request was denied.

Motion and legal standard

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requiring the school district to fund iBRAIN under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s stay-put provision. Ordinarily, a preliminary injunction requires consideration of likely success or serious legal questions, irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest. The court explained, however, that the stay-put provision creates an automatic injunction maintaining the child’s educational status quo when the provision applies. Under that rule, the plaintiffs would not need to satisfy the ordinary discretionary factors if they could show that iBRAIN was M.C.’s pendency placement.

Court’s reasoning

The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not make that showing. Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Ventura de Paulino and the reasoning in the court’s prior related proceeding, it held that the plaintiffs’ argument based on iBRAIN’s claimed substantial similarity to iHOPE was foreclosed. The court stated that parents are not entitled to public funding under the stay-put provision for a new school merely because they claim it is substantially similar to the last agreed-upon placement. Because the plaintiffs could not succeed on their pendency claim, they were not entitled to the requested injunction.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in its entirety. The order resolved the motion listed as Docket Entry 3 and stated that the case remained referred to Magistrate Judge Aaron for general pretrial management.