Jones v. Berryhill

Background

Michael T. Jones applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability from major depression, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. The Social Security Administration denied his later application, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that he was not disabled. The ALJ found severe impairments including major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance abuse disorder. The ALJ found that his back and arm conditions and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder were not severe.

The ALJ determined that Michael could perform work at all physical exertion levels, subject to limits for low-stress work, simple and repetitive tasks, and only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Relying on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that he could perform jobs such as marker, routing clerk, and cleaner or housekeeper. Michael died on October 4, 2019, and the court later allowed Shane Jones to substitute as plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Shane Jones argued that the ALJ had constructively reopened Michael’s earlier disability application; improperly evaluated his severe and non-severe impairments; incorrectly found that his conditions did not meet Listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.11, or 12.15; failed to give controlling weight to treating psychiatrist Dr. Quazi Al-Tariq’s opinion; improperly evaluated Michael’s statements about his symptoms; incorrectly assessed his residual functional capacity (RFC), meaning the most work a person can perform despite medical limitations; and failed to show that enough jobs existed in the national economy.

The Commissioner argued that the ALJ used the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the decision. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the ALJ did not constructively reopen the earlier application. The ALJ mentioned the earlier proceeding as background and considered some earlier medical records because they were relevant to the period covered by the later application. But the ALJ did not review the entire earlier record or decide the earlier claim on its merits.

The court rejected the challenge to the step-two impairment findings. It noted that the ALJ had expressly listed post-traumatic stress disorder as a severe impairment. The court also agreed that the record did not show that the wrist, arm, or related imaging findings had more than a minimal effect on Michael’s ability to work.

The court upheld the ALJ’s finding that the mental impairments did not meet or equal the listed disorders. The court found substantial evidence supporting moderate limitations in understanding and applying information, interacting with others, and concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The court said the ALJ’s assessment of Michael’s ability to adapt and manage himself was puzzling and was not adequately supported, including because the ALJ did not address conflicting evidence about grooming or Dr. Antiaris’s opinion that Michael was markedly limited in dealing with stress. The court nevertheless found that any error was harmless because the record did not show an extreme limitation in that area and the other findings did not establish the required listing criteria. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met because Michael showed improvement with medication.

The court upheld the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Al-Tariq’s opinion. The court explained that the opinion mainly consisted of checked boxes, provided little explanation, and conflicted with treatment notes and other medical opinions. The court concluded that the ALJ applied the substance of the treating-physician rule and gave good reasons for the weight assigned to the opinion. The court also declined to rely on opinions that were either not part of the administrative record or had been properly excluded by the ALJ.

The court further upheld the ALJ’s evaluation of Michael’s statements about his symptoms. The ALJ had compared those statements with the medical evidence, treatment history, daily activities, and other evidence, and concluded that the claimed severity and effects of the symptoms were inconsistent with the record.

Because the court found no error in the underlying findings, it rejected the challenge to the RFC assessment. At the final step of the disability analysis, the court held that the ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that significant numbers of jobs existed in the national economy. The court also rejected the argument that the ALJ should have used an older age category for Michael, because he was almost ten months short of entering that category when the ALJ issued the decision.

Disposition

Judge Paul E. Davison denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions and close the case.