Singh v. Excel Security Corp.

Background

Harinder Jeet Singh sued RXR 620 Master Lease, LLC, RXR Property Management LLC, and Securitas Security Services Corporation. The opinion states that Singh proceeded without a lawyer, although counsel had drafted and submitted the complaint. He alleged discrimination, retaliation, and conspiracy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Excel Security Corp. had previously been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), which concerns inadequate service of process.

Singh had worked for several security companies as the Fire Safety Director/Emergency Action Plan Director at a building located at 620 Avenue of the Americas. When Securitas took over the building’s security contract in 2012, employees were told to apply for positions by August 30. Singh was in India on an approved vacation, had disabled his cell-phone service, and did not apply by the deadline. Securitas ultimately gave the position to Damon Lindsay, the only person who had applied. Singh applied after returning on September 10, 2012, but Securitas told him that the building’s positions had been filled. The opinion states that Securitas claimed to have offered him comparable positions at other buildings, while Singh did not recall whether such offers were made.

Claims and Analysis

The court first addressed Singh’s failure-to-promote claim, which was directed only at Excel. Because Excel had already been dismissed, the court dismissed Count One.

The court construed the failure-to-hire claims in Counts Two and Three as directed only at Securitas, and dismissed those counts as against RXR because RXR was not Singh’s employer for purposes of Title VII. The court described RXR’s relationship with Securitas as that of a contractor and independent contractor and noted that Singh never worked for or applied to work for RXR.

For the Title VII discrimination claim, the court applied the burden-shifting framework used to evaluate employment-discrimination claims. It assumed that Singh was in a protected class, was qualified for the position, and was not hired. But the court held that Singh did not show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination. By the time he applied, the position had already been filled; Securitas had tried to contact him; and the court found no evidence that Securitas knew his race or national origin or made comments about them. The court also found no evidence that RXR discriminated against Singh. Although a jury could find that Michael Aisner disliked Singh and did not want him working at the building, the court held that personal hostility, without a connection to a legally protected characteristic, is not unlawful Title VII discrimination.

The court alternatively held that Securitas had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Singh at the building: he did not apply until after the position had been filled. The court found that Singh’s assertion that this explanation was false did not provide enough evidence to show that discrimination was the real reason. The court therefore granted summary judgment on Count Two.

For the retaliation claim, the court treated Singh’s earlier Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint as protected activity and his failure to be hired as an adverse employment action. But the court held that Singh had no evidence that Securitas knew about the complaint. The court also found no causal connection because the complaint had been filed against Excel in 2009, while Singh applied to Securitas in 2012. The court again held that Singh had not shown that Securitas’s stated reason was a pretext for retaliation and granted summary judgment on Count Three.

For the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, the court explained that the statute requires evidence of an agreement to deprive someone of equal legal protection, an act advancing the agreement, and resulting injury or loss of a legal right. The court also stated that the alleged conspiracy must be motivated by racial or another class-based discriminatory purpose. It held that § 1985(3) could not be used to pursue alleged violations of Title VII because Title VII has its own administrative and enforcement process. Independently, the court found insufficient evidence of a conspiracy. Even if Aisner wanted Securitas not to hire Singh at the building and Securitas was willing to follow that request, the court held that Singh had no legal right to employment with Securitas. The court therefore granted summary judgment on Count Four.

Disposition

Judge Paul A. Crotty granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Count One because Excel had already been dismissed; dismissed Counts Two and Three as against RXR; granted summary judgment to Securitas on Counts Two and Three; and granted summary judgment to Securitas and RXR on Count Four. The clerk was directed to close the motion and the case.