Joseph v. Springer Nature

Background

Rhawn Joseph, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that he found evidence of possible extraterrestrial life on Venus and Mars. He submitted two articles to Astrophysics and Space Science, an academic journal owned by Springer or one of its subsidiaries. The journal published his Venus article, but required additional independent peer review before it would consider publishing his Mars article. Joseph withdrew the Mars article and later demanded that the journal remove the Venus article from its website and refund $3,200.

After further review, the journal announced that it would retract the Venus article. It left the article online with a retraction notice and a watermark. Joseph sued Springer Nature, related entities, and two journal editors. His claims were styled as copyright infringement; breach of contract and tortious interference; libel and defamation; fraud, false advertising, and deceptive trade practices; personal injury and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence. He sought injunctive relief and substantial damages.

Only Springer Nature America, Inc. and Springer Nature Academic Publishing LLC appeared and moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim. The court also dismissed the claims against the nonappearing defendants.

Copyright claim

Joseph alleged that the defendants infringed his copyright by refusing to remove the Venus article and by marking it as retracted. The court found that Joseph’s agreement gave the publisher a nonexclusive, irrevocable, and sublicensable right, unlimited in time and territory, to publish, distribute, transmit, and make the article available. Because the publisher used the copyright as the agreement allowed, the court dismissed the copyright claim against all defendants.

Contract and tortious-interference claims

The court rejected Joseph’s claim concerning the Mars article because the agreement said the publisher would consider publication subject to editorial acceptance. Requiring additional review was therefore not a breach, and Joseph withdrew the article before the publisher decided whether to publish it.

The court also rejected the claim concerning the Venus article because the agreement allowed the publisher to retract the article or publish a correction or other notice when, in its reasonable opinion, that was appropriate for legal, editorial, or research-integrity reasons. The court concluded that the publisher acted within that provision. Because tortious interference with a contract requires an actual breach, the court dismissed that claim as well.

Libel claim

The court treated Joseph’s claim for libel and defamation as a libel claim, meaning defamation through written expression. It found that the April and June 2020 emails were private communications to Joseph, with no pleaded facts showing that anyone else read them. The court therefore found no publication to a third party.

The court also found that Joseph’s allegations about the June 23, 2020 website notice were conclusory and inconsistent with the journal’s communications about obtaining reviews from two independent experts. In addition, Joseph’s agreement allowed the publisher to publish a correction or other notice. The court rejected allegations about other statements because Joseph did not provide enough information about what was said, who said it, when it was said, or to whom it was communicated.

The court considered the later retraction notice only to decide whether adding that allegation would be futile. It held that the notice expressed the editors’ and publisher’s judgment about the scientific article and was therefore a nonactionable opinion. The court emphasized that statements of scientific conclusions about unsettled scientific questions cannot support a defamation damages claim.

Other tort and business-related claims

The court dismissed Joseph’s personal-injury, negligence, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims because they sought damages for reputational injury and duplicated the libel claim.

The court also rejected the false-advertising and deceptive-trade-practices theories. Joseph did not explain what retraction procedures were advertised, how the defendants failed to follow them, what the referenced publication guidelines required, or how any conduct misled consumers. The court noted that the agreement expressly allowed a retraction or other notice.

Joseph’s fraud theory was based primarily on the alleged promise to refund $3,200. The court stated that the complaint did not explain why the refund statement was fraudulent or how it showed fraudulent intent. Although an amendment might ordinarily be allowed to correct such defects, the court concluded that amendment in federal court would be futile because it had dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. The court also found that the pleaded facts suggested losses of no more than $3,200 for this theory, below the amount required for diversity jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and declined to allow Joseph to amend his complaint for a third time. Joseph’s fraud claim based on the alleged failure to refund $3,200 was dismissed without prejudice, allowing him to pursue that claim in state court. All of his other claims were dismissed with prejudice. The court terminated the pending and other motions and closed the case.