Barrios v. Bello

Background

Jennifer Barrios and Luz Mary Barrios sued Miguel Bello and Mayalyn Ines Negron over an October 7, 2018 motor vehicle accident in the Bronx. Jennifer was driving an SUV, with Luz as a passenger, when Bello’s motorcycle and then Negron’s sedan collided with the SUV. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ negligent driving caused their personal injuries and economic losses.

The complaint asserted four causes of action: Jennifer’s negligence claim against Bello and Negron; Jennifer’s negligent-entrustment claim against Bello; Luz’s negligence claim against Bello and Negron; and Luz’s negligent-entrustment claim against Bello. The plaintiffs alleged that Bello owned the sedan driven by Negron and negligently entrusted it to her. Negron asserted a counterclaim against Jennifer, alleging that Jennifer’s negligence caused Luz’s injuries and seeking contribution and indemnification if Negron were held liable. Negron also asserted a crossclaim against Bello, but the opinion addresses the counterclaim rather than ruling on the crossclaim.

Bello’s Motion to Dismiss

Bello moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a pleading does not state a legally sufficient claim. He argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege that he had special knowledge that Negron was incompetent to operate a motor vehicle. He also submitted an affidavit stating that he had no reason to know that Negron was an unsafe or dangerous driver.

The court declined to consider Bello’s affidavit. A Rule 12(b)(6) decision generally examines the complaint and certain documents attached to or incorporated into it, not outside evidence. The court therefore treated the motion only as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and did not convert it into a motion for summary judgment, which would have involved evidence outside the pleadings.

Under New York law, a negligent-entrustment claim requires facts showing that the vehicle owner knew, or should have known, that the person receiving the vehicle was not competent to use it safely. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were only conclusory statements about Bello’s duty and negligence. They alleged no facts showing Bello’s knowledge of any incompetence by Negron or facts supporting an inference that he should have known of it. The court therefore granted Bello’s motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligent-entrustment claims—the second and fourth causes of action—without prejudice.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Negron’s Counterclaim

The plaintiffs moved to dismiss Negron’s counterclaim. Negron did not oppose or otherwise respond, so the court treated the motion as unopposed. The court nevertheless evaluated the motion on its merits rather than granting it automatically.

The counterclaim alleged, in conclusory terms, that the injuries and damages resulted from Jennifer’s negligence and sought contribution and indemnification. It alleged no facts describing how Jennifer drove negligently or how her conduct caused Luz’s injuries. Because the counterclaim did not contain factual allegations that would support an inference of liability, it did not satisfy the pleading requirements applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed Negron’s counterclaim against Jennifer without prejudice.

Disposition

Judge John P. Cronan granted Bello’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ negligent-entrustment claims and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Negron’s counterclaim. Both dismissals were without prejudice. The court stated that amendment might be possible and required any party seeking to amend its pleadings to file a pre-motion letter under the court’s individual rules within two weeks of the order. The court also directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion pending on Docket Number 30.