Akhtar v. Saudia

Background

Armeen Akhtar alleged that Saudia employed her at John F. Kennedy Airport for 22 years before terminating her employment on July 31, 2017. She alleged that Husam Al Subaiy, her supervisor beginning in 2011, and other Saudia employees mistreated her because she was a woman of Pakistani descent. The alleged conduct included using an ethnic slur, excluding her from meetings and training, denying or changing work opportunities, assigning her personal tasks, treating male and non-Pakistani employees more favorably, and retaliating against her after she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge. She also alleged that her termination was presented as downsizing but was actually motivated by discrimination and retaliation.

Akhtar asserted claims under Section 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Saudia moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, arguing that some claims were not legally available, had not been properly presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or relied on untimely allegations.

Section 1981 claims

The court explained that Section 1981 does not create a claim based only on national origin. It can, however, cover intentional discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics. The court concluded that Akhtar’s allegations—including the alleged use of an ethnic slur, treatment of Pakistani employees as inferior, and different treatment based on Pakistani ancestry or ethnicity—plausibly stated a Section 1981 discrimination claim. Her allegations that employees retaliated against her after she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge also plausibly stated a Section 1981 retaliation claim.

The court denied Saudia’s motion insofar as it sought dismissal of the Section 1981 claims. The court also granted Akhtar leave to file a second amended complaint asserting Section 1981 discrimination claims based on Pakistani ancestry or ethnicity.

Title VII exhaustion and timeliness

The court rejected Saudia’s argument that Akhtar had failed to exhaust her Title VII national-origin claim through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Although her second charge did not consistently use the words “national origin” in its factual narrative, it identified her Pakistani descent and described conduct involving language, ethnic treatment, and discriminatory beliefs. The court held that these allegations were reasonably related to the national-origin claim in the amended complaint and denied the motion to dismiss that claim for lack of exhaustion.

The court separately held that the termination, standing alone, could not make earlier, untimely discrete acts actionable under Title VII. It therefore granted the motion to dismiss to the extent Akhtar’s Title VII claim relied on discrete discriminatory acts occurring before June 2017. The court nevertheless held that her allegations plausibly stated a timely hostile-work-environment claim. Because she alleged continuing harassment, exclusion, ridicule, and mistreatment through an incident on June 5, 2017, the court allowed the hostile-work-environment claim to include related conduct occurring earlier, to the extent that conduct was not a separate time-barred act.

New York State and New York City claims

For the New York State Human Rights Law, the court allowed Akhtar’s hostile-work-environment claim to include related discriminatory conduct from 2011 through 2017. It granted the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim was based on time-barred discrete acts occurring before April 2, 2015, such as certain earlier title or vacation-related decisions.

For the New York City Human Rights Law, the court held that Akhtar plausibly alleged discrimination and retaliation under that law’s broader pleading standard. It denied the motion to dismiss those claims, stating that the precise relationship among the alleged incidents and which acts might ultimately be time-barred could not be determined at the pleading stage.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted in part and denied in part Saudia’s partial motion to dismiss. The motion was granted to the extent Akhtar’s Title VII and New York State claims relied on time-barred discrete acts, and it was denied in all other respects. Akhtar was granted 21 days to file the specified second amended complaint. The case continued to be referred to Magistrate Judge Freeman for general pretrial management.