Holloway v. Holy See

Background

Gloria Holloway sued the Holy See solely on her own behalf. She alleged that Reverend Timothy Cawley sexually assaulted her while she was a minor student at St. Mary of the Pines school in Chatawa, Mississippi, in 1967. She alleged that she continues to suffer emotional and psychological injuries. Holloway currently resides in New York.

The complaint asserted claims including responsibility for another person’s conduct, violations of customary international law, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and injunctive relief. The central theory was that the Holy See mandated the concealment of sexual abuse by Catholic Church clergy and agents in the United States, making it liable for Reverend Cawley’s conduct.

Holloway filed the case in the Southern District of New York in 2019. She acknowledged that the statute of limitations had expired under Mississippi law but argued that New York’s Child Victims Act revived her claims.

Venue ruling

The Holy See moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper venue. The court focused its decision on Rule 12(b)(3), which allows dismissal when the case was filed in the wrong federal district.

Under the venue statute for lawsuits against a foreign state, a case may be brought where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. The court held that no part of the events underlying Holloway’s claims occurred in New York. The alleged assault occurred in Mississippi, and the court stated that venue in sexual-abuse cases generally lies where the abuse occurred.

The court rejected Holloway’s arguments that New York was proper because the case relied on the New York Child Victims Act, because the Holy See conducted fundraising in New York, because she experienced continuing psychological effects in New York, or because she currently lived there. The court stated that the Child Victims Act does not create a cause of action or regulate conduct; the fundraising activities were unrelated to the claims; the location of a tort’s effects does not establish venue; and Holloway’s current residence was irrelevant under the foreign-state venue statute.

Other issues and disposition

Because venue was improper, the court did not need to decide whether an exception to foreign sovereign immunity provided subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also stated that, in any event, the claims were time-barred under New York’s borrowing statute, which generally applies the shorter limitations period of the place where the claim arose unless the plaintiff was a New York resident when the claim accrued. The court said Holloway had conceded that her claims were untimely under Mississippi law and that the Child Victims Act did not prevent application of the borrowing statute.

The court granted the Holy See’s motion to dismiss in its entirety and dismissed the case in its entirety for improper venue. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the pending motion and close the case. The court also denied Holloway’s request for leave to amend because the facts relevant to venue were not disputed.