Shutsha v. NYPD Sgt. Cao

Background

Sekou Shutsha, who was incarcerated on unrelated charges and represented himself, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that on June 14, 2014, while he was on a subway train entering the 59th Street-Columbus Circle Station in Manhattan, officers forced him off the train, handcuffed him, and took possession of his bag. He alleged that NYPD Sergeant Raymond Ip unlawfully searched the bag while NYPD Sergeant Cao stood by in approval.

Shutsha alleged that the search led to his conviction and imprisonment for three and a half years. He sought damages for the loss of freedom, injury to his reputation, and pain and suffering. He originally filed the action in December 2020. In an earlier order, the court found that the claim appeared untimely but allowed him to amend the complaint to allege facts supporting equitable tolling, which can extend a filing deadline in limited circumstances. Shutsha filed an amended complaint on April 22, 2021.

Court’s Analysis

The court screened the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires courts to dismiss certain prisoner complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek relief from an immune defendant. The court also considered whether the complaint was filed too late.

The court explained that § 1983 claims in New York generally have a three-year limitations period. A claim ordinarily accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. The court determined that Shutsha’s claim for an unconstitutional search accrued on June 14, 2014, when the search occurred. The later suppression of evidence in his criminal case did not delay accrual. Because Shutsha filed his original complaint in December 2020, the court held that the claim was time-barred.

The court had allowed Shutsha to plead facts supporting equitable tolling. He alleged that he received medication for chronic depression between June 2014 and July 2015, experienced additional mental-health episodes beginning on an unspecified November 17 and continuing until January 2019, was taken to local psychiatric hospital units, and had recently been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The court held that these allegations did not show both that he pursued his rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. They also did not establish that he met the standard for tolling based on insanity under New York law.

Disposition

The court dismissed Shutsha’s Fourth Amendment claim arising from the 2014 arrest as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because Shutsha had already received an opportunity to amend and the defects could not be cured by another amendment, the court declined to grant further leave to amend.

The court declined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that Shutsha may have been asserting. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying fees for purposes of an appeal.