Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. The City of Yonkers

Background

Santander Consumer USA, Inc. brought the action against The City of Yonkers, A.P.O.W. Towing, LLC, and Harold Wuestenhoefer. Santander alleged that Yonkers maintained unlawful and unconstitutional towing policies under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1224 and Lien Law § 184. Santander alleged that the defendants unlawfully towed a vehicle on which Santander held a lien, depriving Santander of the value of its collateral and causing it to incur fees. Santander sought, among other relief, declarations that it owed no monetary charges to the City and that the relevant statutes were unconstitutional.

Kate Mensah, the vehicle’s owner, moved to join the action. She alleged that the defendants towed her vehicle on the claim that it had been abandoned even though it was parked outside her home. She acknowledged that she had not paid certain fines at first, but alleged that she paid them while the vehicle remained seized and that the defendants still refused to release it. She sought declarations that she owed no monetary charges to the City and that the relevant statutes unconstitutionally deprived her of due process, as well as damages for the loss of enjoyment of her property.

Legal standard

Mensah sought intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or, alternatively, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Permissive intervention allows a court to let a person join an existing case when the request is timely and the person’s claims share a legal or factual question with the original action, so long as joining the case will not cause undue delay or prejudice.

The court explained that intervention generally is not decided by examining the ultimate merits of the proposed intervenor’s claims. Instead, the court accepts non-conclusory allegations as true for purposes of the motion, unless they are frivolous on their face.

Discussion

The court found Mensah’s application timely. The action had begun less than a year earlier, she had not initially been notified of it, and she stated that she contracted COVID-19 in fall 2020 after learning of the action. The court found that this reasonably explained the delay. Mensah retained an attorney in March 2021, who promptly contacted the other parties.

The court also found no undue prejudice. The intervention occurred before discovery closed, and information already exchanged by the parties had been provided to Mensah’s counsel. Mensah’s counsel indicated that any additional discovery would not be significant. Neither Santander nor Yonkers claimed prejudice, and the court found no prejudice to any party.

The court further found common legal and factual questions. Santander and Mensah both claimed interests in the same vehicle, alleged that it was unlawfully seized, challenged the constitutionality of the relevant statutes, and sought declarations concerning monetary charges owed to the City or the towing defendants. Their claims also involved largely the same discovery because they arose from the same event and concerned the same property.

The Joint Defendants argued about the merits of Mensah’s claims, including whether the seizure was lawful, whether Mensah was behind on payments to Santander, and whether she had unresolved vehicle fines. The court held that those arguments were inappropriate when deciding intervention because Mensah’s allegations had to be treated as true at this stage. The court found that her allegations were not frivolous and stated that she had presented a prima facie case that she was unlawfully deprived of the right to enjoy her property.

Ruling

Judge Paul E. Davison granted Mensah’s motion for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Because the motion was granted on that basis, the court did not reach her alternative request to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2). Mensah was ordered to file her complaint within three business days, and the Clerk was directed to close docket entry 53.