Lexington Furniture Industries, Inc. v. The Lexington Company, AB
- P. Castel
- 1:19-cv-06239
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
Lexington Furniture v. Lexington Company: Judge Castel barred the defendant’s CEO from testifying at trial because her disclosure came too late.
The ruling affects the defendant, The Lexington Company, AB d/b/a The Lexington Clothing Company, by preventing its CEO, Kristina Lindhe, from testifying in the defendant’s case in chief; it also grants the plaintiff, Lexington Furniture Industries, Inc. d/b/a Lexington Home Brands, limited relief on its motions.
What happened
In Lexington Furniture Industries, Inc. v. The Lexington Company, AB, the defendant disclosed its CEO, Kristina Lindhe, more than a year after discovery ended and shortly before trial preparations. The plaintiff objected to her testifying.
The court considered the reason for the late disclosure, the importance of her testimony, the harm to the plaintiff, and the effect on the trial schedule. It found that the defendant’s failure to identify her was not substantially justified or harmless, and that the defendant’s COO could testify about the same subjects.
Judge P. Castel granted the plaintiff’s motions only to the limited extent of preventing Kristina Lindhe from testifying in the defendant’s main trial presentation. The order did not limit the COO’s testimony or the defendant’s ability to object to the plaintiff’s evidence.
The detailed version
- Lexington Furniture Industries, Inc. v. The Lexington Company, AB · No. 1:19-cv-06239
- P. Castel
- May 27, 2021
Background
Fact discovery closed on February 14, 2020. The defendant’s required initial disclosures were due September 27, 2019. Those disclosures identified Tommy Lindhe, the defendant’s chief operating officer and chairman, but did not identify Kristina Lindhe, the defendant’s chief executive officer, as someone likely to have information that the defendant might use at trial.
The defendant did not claim that the omission was accidental or a mistake. Because Kristina Lindhe was not disclosed, the plaintiff did not seek her deposition. On May 19, 2021, while the parties were preparing final pretrial submissions, the defendant supplemented its disclosure to identify her. The plaintiff objected to the late disclosure and to her testifying at trial.
Court’s analysis
The court evaluated four factors: the defendant’s explanation for the violation, the importance of Kristina Lindhe’s testimony, the prejudice to the plaintiff, and the effect on the case schedule. The defendant blamed the plaintiff for producing some of the defendant’s advertising and marketing material after discovery closed, but the court found that Kristina Lindhe had been identified on the same subjects as Tommy Lindhe and that the defendant had known about those subjects when it made its original disclosures.
The court also found that Tommy Lindhe could testify about the same topics, because the two disclosures were identical in the relevant respects. Allowing the late disclosure would require the plaintiff to depose Kristina Lindhe before trial. The court concluded that this could lead to broader reopening of discovery, including additional witness examinations and document production, and would delay the trial schedule.
Under Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party that fails to make a required disclosure generally may not use the undisclosed information or witness unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless. The court concluded that the defendant’s failure to disclose Kristina Lindhe was neither. It also rejected the defendant’s argument that excluding her testimony would be unjust, noting that she had not been identified in the original disclosures or at any time before discovery closed.
Ruling
Judge P. Castel granted the plaintiff’s motions, Documents 129 and 131, to the limited extent of precluding Kristina Lindhe’s testimony in the defendant’s case in chief. The court did not limit Tommy Lindhe’s testimony on any claim or defense and did not limit the defendant’s right to object to the plaintiff’s evidence. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motions.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.