Jones v. Cuomo, in his official capacity as the Governor of New York

Background

Jeffrey D. Jones, an attorney proceeding without a lawyer, sued Andrew M. Cuomo, in his official capacity as Governor of New York, and Howard Zucker, M.D., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York Department of Health. Jones challenged Executive Order No. 205, which required travelers entering New York from states meeting specified COVID-19 positivity-rate thresholds to quarantine for 14 days. The order was enforceable under New York’s Public Health Law, and violations could result in a civil penalty of up to $10,000.

Jones alleged that he resided in Oklahoma, had recently traveled to Arkansas, and represented New York-based clients in employment disputes. He claimed that the quarantine requirement would prevent him from properly serving those clients if he traveled to New York. His amended complaint asserted violations of the right to interstate travel, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and the Article I Contracts Clause. He also claimed that the order was unconstitutionally vague and sought damages.

Mootness

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a claim for relief. By the time of the motion, Executive Order No. 205 had been replaced by later orders and guidance. The updated guidance no longer required asymptomatic travelers to quarantine, regardless of where they came from.

The court nevertheless held that the case was not moot. It reasoned that the COVID-19 pandemic remained unpredictable and that Governor Cuomo retained authority to reintroduce or modify restrictions subject to specified procedures. The court therefore found that Jones faced a continuing threat of encountering a similar quarantine requirement and proceeded to consider the motion to dismiss.

Constitutional claims

The court held that the quarantine requirement survived review under both the deferential standard associated with Jacobson v. Massachusetts and traditional constitutional scrutiny. It found that COVID-19 was highly infectious, that asymptomatic people could transmit it, and that the 14-day period corresponded to the upper end of the virus’s incubation period. The court concluded that the requirement had a real and substantial relation to protecting public health and was not a plainly improper invasion of constitutional rights.

The court also assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the order burdened the fundamental right to travel. Even under strict scrutiny, the court found that stopping the spread of COVID-19 was a compelling government interest and that the order was narrowly tailored because it applied only to travelers from states with significant community transmission. The court rejected Jones’s proposed alternatives, including masks, contact-tracing surveys, and social-distancing pledges, as insufficient to show that less restrictive measures would have achieved the state’s goals. Under rational-basis review, the court likewise found a rational connection between requiring travelers from high-positivity states to quarantine and reducing the spread of COVID-19.

On equal protection, the court held that Jones had not plausibly alleged that he was treated differently from similarly situated people. Travelers from states not covered by the quarantine requirement were not similarly situated because they came from states with objectively lower infection rates. Jones also did not allege an intent to discriminate or an intent to punish the exercise of constitutional rights.

On the Article IV Privileges and Immunities claim, the court held that the order applied equally to New York residents returning from restricted states and to nonresidents arriving from those states. The court also found that the order had a public-health purpose rather than a protectionist purpose favoring New York residents over nonresidents. Jones therefore failed to establish a violation of that clause.

The court separately treated the Contracts Clause and vagueness claims, as well as claims for damages, as conceded because Jones withdrew the Contracts Clause claim and did not respond to the defendants’ arguments concerning the other claims.

Disposition

The court denied Jones leave to amend because he had already amended his complaint, had been notified of its deficiencies, and further amendment would be futile. Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the pending motions, adjourn remaining dates, and close the case.