Shukla v. Deloitte Consulting LLP

Background

Shukla, proceeding without a lawyer, asserted federal and state discrimination and retaliation claims against Deloitte Consulting LLP, identified in the opinion as his former employer. Before this order, the court had adopted Magistrate Judge Aaron’s recommendation to dismiss several claims in Shukla’s Third Amended Complaint and to deny leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. Shukla appealed that earlier decision to the Second Circuit, and the appeal was pending.

On May 13, 2021, Magistrate Judge Aaron held a conference about discovery disputes and entered a discovery order. Among other things, the order relieved Deloitte of any outstanding obligation to respond to Shukla’s prior document requests, allowed Shukla to serve one final set of no more than 20 document requests including subparts, and required Shukla to respond to certain outstanding discovery requests. Shukla filed a motion seeking to partially vacate that order.

Discovery Objection

The district court treated Shukla’s motion as an objection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Discovery orders generally concern pretrial matters that do not dispose of the litigation. The court therefore reviewed the challenged portions for clear error or a ruling contrary to law, meaning a serious factual mistake or a decision inconsistent with governing law.

The court declined to reconsider Shukla’s arguments about the earlier dismissal of claims and denial of leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint because those issues were not part of Magistrate Judge Aaron’s discovery order. The court overruled those objections.

The court also upheld the requirement that Shukla produce any documents, including emails, recordings, or other records, supporting his assertion that Ms. Rohde was a federal agent. Although that assertion was not part of the operative Third Amended Complaint, the court noted that Shukla continued to raise it in filings and made other allegations about Ms. Rohde. The court concluded that documents concerning the assertion could be relevant to the claims and defenses and that requiring their production was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

The court rejected Shukla’s claim that Magistrate Judge Aaron was biased toward Deloitte. It stated that Shukla offered no evidence or support beyond the fact that the magistrate judge had ruled against him and that the magistrate judge had a female court clerk. The court described those accusations as baseless and found that the remaining arguments lacked merit. It held that Magistrate Judge Aaron’s discovery rulings were not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Warnings About Future Filings

The court found that Shukla had filed excessive, unnecessary, or inappropriate motions, objections, and letters. It identified repeated challenges to unfavorable rulings, use of letters to make substantive legal arguments, use of letters to add factual allegations or accusations, and factual assertions that lacked evidentiary support.

The court directed Shukla to challenge rulings only through a motion for reconsideration, a proper objection to a magistrate judge’s order, or an appeal to the Second Circuit when the order was appealable. It stated that letters should generally be limited to scheduling, extensions, requests concerning page limits or court rules, and similar procedural matters. It further directed Shukla not to use letters to present legal arguments, factual allegations supporting his claims, or unsupported allegations of bias or impropriety.

The court explained that it would continue to give consideration to Shukla’s lack of legal representation but that all litigants must follow court orders. It warned that failure to follow the rules could lead to sanctions, including an order requiring permission before filing, and that continued failure to comply with court orders could lead to dismissal of the case.

Disposition

The court overruled Shukla’s objection and stated that the order resolved Docket Number 252. It also found under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying the filing fee.