Kellier v. Billups

Background

Joshua Kellier, representing himself, sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state law. The defendants included employees and officials associated with the Neighborhood Association for Inter-Cultural Affairs, Skyway Men’s Shelter, the New York City Department of Homeless Services, the Coalition for the Homeless, Samaritan Village, police officers, Mayor Bill De Blasio, and Human Resources Administration Commissioner Steve Banks.

Kellier alleged that defendants discriminated against him because of his race, retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination and shelter conditions, transferred him to undesirable shelters, restricted his ability to file grievances or police reports, denied him a vegan diet, damaged or destroyed his property, and exposed him to unsanitary or substandard conditions. He also alleged disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He sought unspecified injunctive relief and $25 million in damages.

Claims involving the same events as an earlier related proceeding

The court applied claim preclusion, a rule that generally prevents a party from bringing claims that were already decided, or could have been brought, in an earlier case involving the same parties and events. The court found that the earlier related proceeding had been dismissed for failure to state a claim, which operated as a judgment on the merits. It also found that the claims against the NAICA employees, DHS employees Montagna and Hyler, and PO Cheung involved the same parties and arose from the same events.

The court therefore dismissed Kellier’s claims against those defendants for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), based on claim preclusion.

Claims that could be amended

Because Kellier was representing himself, the court granted him leave to amend claims involving defendants who were not part of the earlier related proceeding or events that may have occurred later. The court cautioned that the reasoning in the earlier related proceeding would apply to any new claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police officers, other state actors, or private actors.

The court held that the allegations did not currently show discriminatory or retaliatory intent under the Fair Housing Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Although the court assumed for purposes of the analysis that Kellier was disabled, it stated that placing him in a smaller facility because of a disability could suggest an attempt to accommodate him rather than discrimination. The court granted leave to amend these claims if additional supporting facts were available.

The court also found that the complaint did not connect any defendant’s conduct to Kellier’s race or another characteristic protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and did not clearly show conduct violating that statute. It granted leave to replead the § 1981 claim if additional facts supported it.

As to De Blasio and Banks, the court explained that a claim under § 1983 requires facts showing each defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The complaint did not provide facts showing how either official was personally involved. The court stated that supervisory officials cannot be held liable solely because of their leadership positions and that Kellier would need to allege facts showing their personal involvement if he wished to pursue claims against them.

The court also stated that it would decide later whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims because it was not clear that Kellier could assert a federal claim within the court’s jurisdiction.

Motion for counsel

The court denied Kellier’s request for the court to seek pro bono counsel without prejudice. It explained that the merits of the case are the most important factor in deciding such a request and that it was too early in the proceedings to assess the merits. The ruling left open the possibility of another request at a later stage.

Motion for injunctive relief

Kellier sought an order requiring defendants to show cause concerning injunctive relief. The court explained that this type of preliminary relief requires a showing of likely irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions about the merits combined with a strong balance of hardships.

Because the allegations did not state a viable federal claim at that stage, the court found that Kellier had not shown either a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious questions warranting relief. It denied the request for an order to show cause. The conclusion states that the motions for injunctive relief and counsel were denied without prejudice.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court granted Kellier 60 days to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint must replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and must repeat any facts or claims that Kellier wants the court to consider. The court directed him to identify the relevant defendants, what each defendant allegedly did or failed to do, when and where the events occurred, his injuries, and the relief requested. Any amended claims must not be precluded by the earlier related proceeding.

The court stated that if Kellier did not timely comply and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.