Ayyaz v. New York Police Department

Background

Huma Ayyaz alleged that she was a Pakistani woman who served as a volunteer NYPD auxiliary police officer. Andrew Thaler coordinated her schedule, and Rohit Singh trained and directed auxiliary officers. Ayyaz alleged that, after she rejected Thaler’s requests to go to his home, Thaler and Singh met her at a bus stop on August 22, 2017, drove her in an NYPD van to an unlit alley, and engaged in conduct she understood as a sexual advance. She alleged that Thaler touched her and that Singh asked whether Thaler wanted to “do it” inside or outside the van. She later reported the incident and was granted medical leave.

Ayyaz asserted sex- and race-discrimination claims under Section 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted a Title VII claim against the City. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims lacked jurisdiction or sufficient factual support, that qualified immunity applied to Thaler and Singh, that Ayyaz was not an employee covered by the employment-discrimination statutes, and that Singh was not properly served.

Section 1983 claim against the City

The court granted the motion to dismiss Ayyaz’s Section 1983 claim against the City. To hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a constitutional injury resulted from a municipal policy or custom. The court found that Ayyaz alleged only incidents involving herself and did not allege a sufficiently widespread or persistent practice of sexual harassment or discrimination. The court also found that she did not plead facts supporting municipal liability based on inadequate training or supervision.

Section 1983 claims against Thaler and Singh

The defendants argued that qualified immunity protected Thaler and Singh. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from civil damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right or when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct lawful.

The court denied the motion on this ground. It held that Ayyaz’s Section 1983 claims were based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not solely on employment protections under Title VII. The court concluded that Ayyaz had a clearly established constitutional right to be free from sexual harassment and race and sex discrimination by a state actor, and that no reasonable person would have believed the alleged conduct was lawful. The court therefore denied qualified-immunity dismissal of the claims against both Thaler and Singh.

Title VII, New York State, and New York City claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss Ayyaz’s Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims. The court explained that these laws generally require the plaintiff to qualify as an employee, including by showing remuneration—financial compensation or substantial employment benefits.

Ayyaz alleged that auxiliary officers were unpaid volunteers but argued that eligibility for death benefits, eligibility for benefits through the Auxiliary Police Benevolent Association, and medical leave satisfied the remuneration requirement. The court found that she had not shown that the death or association benefits came from the NYPD and that she did not allege that her medical leave was paid. The court therefore concluded that she had not established employee status and dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim. The court separately denied the argument that failure to plead employee status deprived it of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Claims against Singh and service of process

The court also granted the motion under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) as to all claims against Singh. Proper service is required for a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual. Ayyaz served the summons at the New York Medical Training Center by delivering it to a co-worker, but the recipient said Singh had not been there for more than two years.

The court found that the location was not Singh’s actual place of business because he was not physically present there or regularly conducting business there. Ayyaz’s research into Singh’s social-media profiles and the training center’s website did not establish proper service. The court dismissed all claims against Singh without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service of process.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part. The court granted dismissal of the Section 1983 claim against the City; denied dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Thaler and Singh based on qualified immunity; granted dismissal of the Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims against all defendants; and dismissed all claims against Singh without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service. The court stated that the only surviving claim was Ayyaz’s Section 1983 claim against Thaler.