Gjidija v. United States
- John Keenan
- 1:16-cv-03118
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Gjidija v. United States, Judge Keenan denied Agron Gjidija’s challenge to his firearm conviction and sentence.
Agron Gjidija’s federal firearm conviction and sentence remained in place after the court denied his motion to vacate them.
What happened
In Gjidija v. United States, Agron Gjidija asked the court to vacate his conviction and sentence for brandishing a firearm during a Hobbs Act robbery. He argued that the legal basis for the firearm conviction was unconstitutional.
The government argued that Gjidija’s completed Hobbs Act robbery was a valid violent felony supporting the firearm conviction. Gjidija conceded that the Second Circuit’s decision in Hill controlled the merits of his motion.
Judge Keenan ruled that the completed Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count Eight qualified as a crime of violence under the statute’s force clause, making it a valid basis for the firearm conviction. The court denied the motion, declined to issue a certificate allowing an appeal, and closed the related civil case.
The detailed version
- Gjidija v. United States · No. 1:16-cv-03118
- John Keenan
- Mar. 31, 2021
Background
Agron Gjidija pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, substantive Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the substantive robbery. The court sentenced him to 204 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Gjidija later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence on specified constitutional or legal grounds. He challenged his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), relying initially on Supreme Court decisions holding the residual clause of certain criminal statutes unconstitutionally vague.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis held the residual clause of § 924(c) unconstitutional, the court lifted its stay of Gjidija’s motion. The government argued that the firearm conviction remained valid because the completed Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count Eight qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. Gjidija conceded that the Second Circuit’s decision in Hill governed the merits of his motion.
Analysis
Section 924(c) requires a mandatory consecutive sentence when a person uses, carries, or possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The statute’s force clause defines a crime of violence as a felony that includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person or property.
The court followed Hill and held that substantive Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause. Because the robbery charged in Count Eight was a valid predicate offense, the court concluded that Gjidija’s § 924(c) conviction and sentence were not subject to vacatur. The court therefore denied Gjidija’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
Disposition
The court denied the § 2255 motion. It declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Gjidija had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, directed the clerk to terminate the motion in the criminal case, and closed the related civil case.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.