SHARON ELLIS v. NICKIESHA DALHOUSE

Background

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company brought an interpleader action, a case used to have competing claimants resolve their rights to money held by a neutral stakeholder. The dispute concerned life-insurance benefits payable after Devon Ellis’s death. MetLife deposited the disputed funds with the court, and the court later dismissed MetLife from the action.

Sharon Ellis, identified as Devon Ellis’s sister, had been the sole beneficiary under a July 8, 2017 designation. A later designation, signed on April 16, 2018, allocated 20% of the proceeds to Ellis, 20% to Renee Richards, 45% to Nickiesha Dalhouse, 12.5% to Mary Morrow Ojeda, and 2.5% to Vilmont Lindo. The proceeds totaled $403,000.

Ellis filed a cross-claim against Dalhouse and the other competing claimants. Ellis alleged that Morrow Ojeda and Dalhouse induced Devon Ellis to sign the new designation when he was close to death and lacked the capacity to understand the form or its consequences. Ellis sought to revoke or cancel the April 16, 2018 beneficiary-change form. Ellis later settled with Morrow Ojeda, Lindo, and Richards. The funds disputed between Ellis and Dalhouse remained with the court.

Request for Limited Counsel

Dalhouse was representing herself, lived in Jamaica, West Indies, and told the court she could not afford to retain counsel. Ellis had scheduled depositions of Morrow Ojeda, Stephen Ojeda, and Dalhouse by remote means. The discovery deadline was August 18, 2021.

The court concluded that Dalhouse’s defenses might have merit but that presenting them effectively would be difficult for an unrepresented person. The court also concluded that counsel would help produce a faster, more efficient, and fairer proceeding.

Scope of the Requested Representation

The court directed the clerk to seek a volunteer lawyer for a limited appearance on Dalhouse’s behalf. The requested representation covered:

- attending the deposition of Morrow Ojeda and the other identified Ojeda witness, including cross-examination when appropriate; - defending Dalhouse during her own deposition; - advising Dalhouse about a possible deposition of Ellis and, if agreed, noticing and conducting that deposition; and - potentially participating in settlement discussions.

The order stated that counsel would not be responsible for matters outside this limited assignment. In particular, counsel would not have to respond to a dispositive motion, meaning a motion seeking a ruling that could end the case or a claim, unless the court expanded the representation. Without such an expansion, the representation would end when discovery closed and counsel filed a notice of completion.

Legal Standard and Disposition

The court explained that federal law allows courts to request an attorney to represent a person who cannot afford counsel, but civil litigants do not have the same guaranteed right to a free lawyer that criminal defendants may have. The court may request, but cannot compel, an attorney to volunteer. The court therefore directed the clerk to attempt to locate pro bono counsel; it did not appoint a lawyer or guarantee that a volunteer would accept the matter.

The order was an ancillary representation and discovery ruling. It did not decide whether Ellis or Dalhouse was entitled to the insurance proceeds, whether the beneficiary change was valid, or whether Ellis’s allegations were true.