Montgomery v. Saul

Background

Keysha Montgomery sought review under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. The administrative law judge found that Montgomery had severe impairments including lumbar-spine degenerative disc disease after surgery, diabetes, glaucoma, asthma, obesity, and an adjustment disorder with dysphoria and anxiety. The administrative law judge determined that Montgomery could perform a limited range of light work, could not perform her past work, but could perform other jobs identified by a vocational expert, including cleaner/housekeeper, bakery racker, and garment folder.

Montgomery moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), and the Commissioner filed a cross-motion. Montgomery argued that the administrative law judge’s residual functional capacity assessment was not supported by substantial evidence, that the vocational expert’s testimony conflicted with the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and that the administrative law judge failed to account for her need for a cane.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the Social Security standard of review, under which an administrative decision must follow the correct legal standards and be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support the conclusion. The court held that the administrative law judge’s assessment was supported by evidence including Dr. Nieto’s opinion that Montgomery could return to normal activities and treatment records showing relatively normal physical findings. The court also noted that the administrative law judge considered Montgomery’s testimony and Dr. Nieto’s cane recommendation but declined to include cane use in the residual functional capacity assessment because Montgomery had a normal gait and used no assistive device during a consultative examination.

The court found no apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. It concluded that Montgomery had relied on descriptions for a different industrial-cleaner job rather than the cleaner/housekeeper job identified by the vocational expert. The court also found that the descriptions for bakery racker and cleaner/housekeeper did not state that those jobs required the heavy machinery, frequent irritant exposure, or work at heights asserted by Montgomery. In addition, any error concerning those two jobs would have been harmless because Montgomery did not challenge the vocational expert’s testimony that she could perform the garment-folder job.

The court likewise held that the administrative law judge adequately addressed Montgomery’s cane use. In any event, the vocational expert testified that Montgomery could still perform the garment-folder job even if she needed a cane for walking. The court noted some uncertainty in the vocational expert’s testimony about the cleaner/housekeeper job but found the testimony clear enough that at least the garment-folder job remained available.

Disposition

The court denied Montgomery’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion. The opinion therefore left the Commissioner’s denial of Montgomery’s applications in place. Judge Stewart D. Aaron did not order a remand.