Lee v. Canada Goose US, Inc.
- Victor Marrero
- 1:20-cv-09809
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 29
In Lee v. Canada Goose US, Inc., Judge Marrero granted in part and denied in part Canada Goose’s motion to dismiss claims about fur-sourcing statements.
George Lee’s proposed class claims against Canada Goose US, Inc.; the ruling allowed some consumer-protection and warranty claims to proceed while dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim, the injunction request, and specified consumer-protection theories.
What happened
Lee v. Canada Goose US, Inc. is a proposed class action about statements on Canada Goose jackets describing its coyote-fur sourcing as ethical, responsible, and sustainable. George Lee alleged that the statements were misleading because the fur could come from trapping methods he considered inhumane.
Canada Goose argued that its statements were accurate, that Lee lacked standing to assert claims under other states’ laws and to seek an injunction, and that some of his claims were duplicative or legally insufficient. Lee argued that the statements could mislead consumers and that his claims should continue at this stage.
Judge Marrero granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. The claims based on the “ethical” and “sustainable” sourcing statements, the state consumer-protection claims, and the express-warranty claim may proceed; the unjust-enrichment claim and request for injunctive relief were dismissed, along with specified parts of the District of Columbia consumer-protection claim.
The detailed version
- Lee v. Canada Goose US, Inc. · No. 1:20-cv-09809
- Victor Marrero
- June 29, 2021
Background
George Lee filed a proposed class action against Canada Goose US, Inc. He alleged that Canada Goose misrepresented the sourcing of coyote fur used on certain jackets. The challenged hang-tag statements described Canada Goose’s fur sourcing as “ethical, responsible, and sustainable,” said that its fur complied with the Agreement of International Humane Trapping Standards and Best Managed Practices, and stated that the company bought fur only from licensed North American trappers regulated by state, provincial, and federal standards.
Lee alleged that these statements misled consumers because Canada Goose’s suppliers used leghold traps and snares, which he claimed caused severe injury, distress, and death to animals. He asserted claims under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, state consumer-protection laws, breach of express warranty, and unjust enrichment. He also sought injunctive relief, meaning a court order requiring conduct to change in the future.
Motion to dismiss
Canada Goose’s premotion letter was treated as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under that rule, the court asks whether the complaint contains enough factual allegations to make a legally plausible claim, while generally accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
Canada Goose argued that the fur-sourcing statements were accurate or too general to be actionable. It also argued that Lee lacked standing to assert claims under consumer-protection laws of states where he had not alleged an injury, that the warranty and unjust-enrichment claims were insufficient or duplicative, and that Lee lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he did not allege a risk of future harm.
Court’s analysis
The court concluded that Lee plausibly alleged that the statements about Canada Goose’s commitment to “ethical, responsible, and sustainable sourcing” could mislead a reasonable consumer. The court considered Lee’s allegations about leghold traps and snares and found that they supported a reasonable inference that Canada Goose obtained fur from trappers using allegedly inhumane methods. The court also found that the statements were material because the complaint alleged that animal welfare affects consumers’ decisions about whether products are ethically or sustainably produced. The court rejected Canada Goose’s argument that these statements were too general or subjective to support a claim.
The court dismissed the parts of Count One based on Canada Goose’s statements about compliance with the international and industry standards and about sourcing from licensed trappers regulated by state, provincial, and federal standards. The court reasoned that Lee had not alleged that those statements were inaccurate; allegations that the standards were inadequate or permitted inhumane practices did not make Canada Goose’s compliance statements misleading. The court also dismissed the part of Count One alleging a violation of District of Columbia Code § 28-3904(h), because Lee did not plausibly allege that Canada Goose advertised ethical and humane sourcing without intending to comply.
The court declined to dismiss Count Two, which asserted claims under state consumer-protection statutes. It reserved the question of Lee’s standing to assert those claims until the class-certification stage. The court also declined to dismiss Count Three for breach of express warranty, finding that Lee was not required at the pleading stage to identify the specific state laws applicable to the claim and that the warranty claim was not duplicative of the statutory consumer-protection claims.
The court dismissed Count Four for unjust enrichment. It reasoned that unjust enrichment was unavailable because an express warranty governed the dispute, and that pleading unjust enrichment in the alternative was not proper where there was no allegation that the express warranty was invalid or nonexistent.
Finally, the court dismissed Lee’s request for injunctive relief. It held that Lee had not alleged an actual and imminent risk of future harm because he was aware of the alleged deception and therefore did not allege that he was likely to buy another Canada Goose product. His proposed class action did not eliminate the requirement that he personally have standing to seek an injunction.
Disposition
The court ordered that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The alleged violation of District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act § 28-3904(h) in Count One was dismissed, while the other Count One theories based on the ethical and sustainable fur-sourcing statements could proceed. The motion to dismiss Count Two was DENIED, and the motion to dismiss Count Three was DENIED. The motion to dismiss Count Four for unjust enrichment was GRANTED, as was the motion to dismiss the request for injunctive relief. The opinion does not state whether the dismissed claims or request were dismissed with or without prejudice.
Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.