Lawtone-Bowles v. The City of New York

Background

Nicole Lawtone-Bowles, proceeding without a lawyer, sued The City of New York (NYC), the New York City Department of Transportation, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the New York City Department of Finance, New York City Police Department traffic agents, and the New York City Office of the Corporation Counsel. She alleged that the defendants failed to accommodate her disability in connection with her application to renew a disabled-person parking permit.

Lawtone-Bowles alleged that she had permanent knee-related disabilities and fibromyalgia, which caused pain, fatigue, and problems involving sleep, memory, mood, and mobility. She said she used a specially equipped vehicle, relied on her sons or caregivers for transportation to medical appointments in New York City, could not use public transportation because of anxiety, and had to pay for ride services because she could not park her vehicle.

She alleged that the Department of Transportation denied her permit renewal application and that the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene refused to certify her as permanently disabled. She did not explain why the application was denied, whether she appealed the health department’s certification decision, or whether a final appeal decision had been issued. She sought damages and asked the court to require the defendants to provide reasonable accommodations.

The opinion also discussed Lawtone-Bowles’s earlier, related employment-discrimination case against the City. In that earlier round, the court allowed a failure-to-accommodate claim to proceed, the parties later settled the remaining claim, and the case was discontinued. The present case concerned a parking permit, not employment.

Legal standard and analysis

Because Lawtone-Bowles had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss if it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented complaints generously, the complaint still had to provide enough facts to make a claim legally plausible.

The court construed the complaint as arising under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title II prohibits a qualified person with a disability from being excluded from a public entity’s services, programs, or activities because of the disability. A claim generally requires allegations that the plaintiff has a disability, is qualified for the public program or service, was excluded from or discriminated against in that program or service, and was excluded or discriminated against because of the disability.

The court held that the City is a public entity covered by Title II and assumed, without deciding, that Lawtone-Bowles had adequately alleged a disability at this stage. But the court found it unclear whether she was a qualified individual for the City’s Special Vehicle Permit program. The court explained that the program involves eligibility requirements concerning matters such as residence, employment, study, transportation needs, and certification of a permanent disability seriously impairing mobility.

The complaint did not identify the reason for the Transportation Department’s denial. It was therefore unclear whether the denial resulted from Lawtone-Bowles’s residence outside New York City, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s refusal to certify her, another reason, or a combination of reasons. The complaint also did not allege facts about the basis for the certification denial, whether she appealed it, or whether the appeal process had ended. The court noted that she had not alleged facts showing that appealing would have been futile.

The court further held that a failure-to-accommodate claim must identify a plausible accommodation that would provide access without fundamentally changing the nature of the public program. Lawtone-Bowles’s request for accommodations “without restrictions” did not identify such an accommodation. To the extent she sought a permit regardless of the medical or other eligibility requirements, or sought to change the medical criteria themselves, the court found those allegations insufficient to show that a reasonable accommodation was available or that it would not fundamentally alter the permit program.

Disposition

The court concluded that Lawtone-Bowles failed to state a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because she might be able to provide additional facts, the court granted her 60 days to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint had to replace the original complaint, include the facts and claims she wanted the court to consider, identify the relevant people and defendants, describe what each defendant did or failed to do and when and where it occurred, explain her injuries, and state the relief sought.

The court instructed her to submit the amended complaint to the Pro Se Intake Unit, label it “Amended Complaint,” and include docket number 21-CV-5620 (LTS). No summons would issue at that time. If she failed to amend within the allowed period and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. The order was signed by Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain.